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Overview 
This thesis explores paranoia in clinical populations with psychosis. Part one presents a 
systematic review and meta-analysis of psychological treatments for psychosis impacting 
on paranoia.  It provides an overview of current interventions, their feasibility and efficacy 
in reducing paranoia. The review provides preliminary evidence for the acceptability and 
efficacy of individual cognitive behavioural therapy for psychosis (CBTp) in improving 
paranoia and associated distress. Results are discussed in the context of potential 
mechanisms of treatment, limitations in generalisability, and the need for further clinical 
trials investigating various psychological approaches to treating persecutory delusions and 
comparisons with active treatment controls.  
 Part two reports on a jointly conducted empirical virtual reality study investigating 
the feasibility of interactive virtual reality as a research tool for individuals with psychosis 
and persecutory delusions. It further investigates the role of interpersonal contingency and 
self-focused attention in the experience of trust. Eighteen male participants with psychosis 
and current paranoia interviewed a virtual flatmate whose non-verbal responses were 
either high or low in contingency to the participants’ behaviour. Interactive virtual reality 
was found to be safe, enjoyable and immersive for this clinical population. Neither the 
contingency of the avatar’s behaviour nor self-focused attention were found to impact on 
participants’ objective trust (i.e. distance kept form the avatar), providing evidence for the 
employment of interpersonal safety behaviours in individuals with persecutory delusions.  
 Part three is a critical appraisal of both the empirical study and the literature 
review. It includes personal reflections on the research processes, including the benefits 
and challenges of recruiting clinical populations and explores the presence and impact of 
dissemination biases in clinical research.  
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Abstract 
Aim: Paranoia is one of the most common distressing experiences reported by people with 
psychosis. In recent years, persecutory delusions have become the focal point of a number of 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for psychosis (CBTp) interventions emerging in clinical literature. 
Numerous meta-analytic reviews have assessed the efficacy of psychological interventions in 
changing symptoms of psychosis, including delusions. However, no review has reviewed the 
breadth, feasibility and efficacy of psychological interventions that have evaluated their impact 
on paranoia. 
Method: A systematic review identified 23 studies detailing interventions for persecutory 
delusions, giving an overall synthesis of developments in paranoia interventions and treatment 
feasibility. Six RCTs (1 group metacognitive training, 5 individual CBTp) were meta-analysed to 
evaluate treatment efficacy compared to TAU.  
Results: The synthesis of studies showed that interventions impacting on paranoia are 
predominantly individual and from a CBT approach. Many were found to be from the same 
research group. Meta-analyses found the group intervention to be ineffective. Further meta-
analyses of individual CBTp found a significant, small to medium effect size of intervention in 
improving paranoia at end-of-treatment on two measures: the delusions subscale of the 
Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scale (PSYRATS-D) (k = 5; d = 0.38) and Green et al. Paranoid 
Thoughts Scale (GPTS) (k = 3; d = 0.31), the latter of which was sustained at follow-up (d = 0.39). 
Significant, medium to large effect sizes of individual CBTp were found in improving distress 
associated with paranoia (k = 3; d = 0.62) and well-being (k = 3; d = 0.50), predominantly 
sustained at follow-up (d = 0.56 and d = 0.42).  
Conclusion: There is a promising outlook for the efficacy and feasibility of CBTp for paranoia. 
Low-intensity CBTp appears to be particularly useful for individuals with persecutory delusions. 
The application of such interventions in clinical settings could stand to increase service-users 
access to, and increase their choice of, psychological treatment for psychosis. However, in 
future research, replication is needed in different settings and from different research groups. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The evolution of psychological treatment for delusions 
Before the emergence of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for psychosis (CBTp) in the early 
1990s, an assumption was held that psychotic symptoms, such as delusions, were 
functionally different from ‘normal’ experiences (Jaspers, 1913). As such, targeting 
delusions directly in therapy was viewed as either futile or detrimental as it was thought 
that the patient would not be responsive to typical mechanisms of reason or learning.  
The development of psychological therapies that directly target delusional beliefs 
emerged from research indicating a continuum between normal and psychotic experiences 
(McGovern and Turkington, 2001; van Os et al., 2009) and emotional and cognitive 
correlates of psychotic symptoms (Garety et al., 2001). Developed from cognitive therapy, 
individually tailored formulation-based CBTp combines broader therapeutic features (e.g. 
psychoeducation, collaboration, guided discovery) with cognitive and behavioural 
techniques that focus on changing key unhelpful cognitions (e.g. about the self and others) 
and can also incorporate challenging the delusional belief itself. Research has 
demonstrated that CBTp is effective in comparison to treatment as usual (TAU) in reducing 
positive symptoms, negative symptoms, impairments in general functioning and symptoms 
of depression (Gould, Mueser, Bolton, Mays & Goff, 2001; Rector & Beck, 2001; 
Zimmerman, Favrod, Trieu & Pomini, 2005; Wykes, Steel, Everitt & Tarrier, 2008; Sarin, 
Wallin & Widerlöv, 2011). The National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
guidelines recommend a minimum of sixteen sessions of CBTp as a first-line treatment for 
psychosis (NICE, 2014). These guidelines were informed by a meta-analysis conducted for 
the purpose of the 2009 guidelines which included 31 randomised control trials (RCTs) that 
predominantly delivered CBTp of this length (NICE, 2009). However, there is now a growing 
body of evidence that briefer, low-intensity CBTp is similarly effective in treating psychosis. 
Hazell et al. (2016) analysed 10 RCTs and found a moderate effect size of low-intensity 
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CBTp in reducing symptoms of psychosis compared to TAU (d = -0.46, 95%-CI: -0.06, -0.86). 
Similarly, Naeem et al. (2016) found a moderate effect size of brief CBTp in 6 RCTs 
compared to TAU (Hedge’s g = 0.43, 95%-CI: 0.24-0.63) and a small to moderate effect size 
in comparison to other psychological treatments in 8 RCTs (Hedge’s g = 0.38, 95%-CI: 0.2-
0.57). 
Studies investigating the efficacy of CBTp commonly report primary outcome 
measures as overall symptom reduction, sometimes subdivided into positive and negative 
symptoms. Thus meta-analyses report pooled estimates of effects for these more general 
outcomes. For example, Gould, Mueser, Bolton, Mays & Goff (2001) analysed pre- post-
intervention change in symptoms of psychosis in 7 clinical trials. The reviewers found a 
medium to large effect size of cognitive therapy (CT) in reducing overall symptoms (d = 
0.65, 95%-CI: 0.56-0.71). Jauhar et al. (2014) analysed 34 RCT studies and found that 
pooled effect sizes were in the ‘small’ range for all classes of symptoms i.e. overall 
symptoms (d = -0.33, 95%-CI: -0.47, -0.19), positive symptoms (d = -0.25, 95%-CI: -0.37, -
0.13) and negative symptoms (d = -0.13, 95%-CI: -0.25, -0.01) in comparison to TAU. 
However, this review found high heterogeneity in variance of effect sizes, suggesting a 
limitation in considering all symptoms of psychosis in the analysis of efficacy of CBTp. A 
Cochrane review (Jones, Hacker, Cormac, Meaden & Irving, 2012) compared CBTp to other 
psychosocial interventions for psychosis. They found no significant effect of CBTp in 
changing global mental state or positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia in 4 RCTs. 
Furthermore, the authors commented that very few studies measured impact of 
interventions on quality of life and social functioning. Against a strong narrative of the 
benefits of CBTp, they concluded that there is no clear and convincing argument for the 
advantage of CBTp over other therapies for psychosis.   
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1.1.1 Effectiveness of psychological Interventions on specific symptoms 
A recent meta-analysis investigated the effectiveness of CBTp in specifically reducing 
delusions and hallucinations, rather than general positive symptoms. Van der Gaag et al. 
(2014) analysed nine randomised controlled trials (RCTs) from a total of 50 RCTs of CBTp, 
(identified in a recent review: Naeem, Farooq & Kingdon, 2014) which detailed secondary 
outcome measures of change in delusions. They found a significant, small to medium effect 
size of CBTp on delusions (Hedge’s g = 0.36) and a slightly stronger effect of CBTp on 
hallucinations (Hedge’s g = 0.44), but did not report confidence intervals. In addition, CBT 
for delusions in comparison to active control was non-significant. However, their inclusion 
criteria of individually tailored formulation-based CBTp meant that studies using other 
theory-driven approaches to changing delusions such as a worry-reduction CBT 
intervention (Foster et al., 2010) or a coping skills based training (Cather et al., 2005) were 
not considered in their review. Mehl, Werner & Lincoln (2015) conducted a meta-analysis 
to specifically investigate the effect of CBTp on delusions which included both formulation-
based CBTp and other theory-driven CBT approaches. Analyses of twelve studies found 
significant, small to medium effect sizes of CBTp vs. TAU at end-of-therapy (d = 0.27, 95%-
CI: 0.08, 0.47) and at an average follow-up period of 47 weeks (d = 0.25, 95%-CI: 0.07, 
0.43).  However, no significant effects were found for CBTp in comparison to other 
interventions. 
1.1.2 A New Strategy for Evaluating Psychological Interventions: How is Change Achieved? 
In a review and revision of the Medical Research Council (MRC) framework for evaluating 
complex interventions (Campbell, Fitzpatric, Haines & Kinmonth 2000), Craig et al. (2008) 
put forward an important point – that there has perhaps been a misled urge to conduct 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) without preparatory work in developing the theory of 
how change is to be achieved. The interventionist-causal model approach (Kendler and 
Campbell, 2009) suggests that interventions should focus on one of several cognitive and 
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emotional factors hypothesised to be involved in the formation and maintenance of 
delusions (Freeman, 2007; Garety, Bebbington, Fowler, Freeman & Kuipers, 2007; Freeman 
& Garety, 2014).   
Several interventions which have been developed to target cognitive and 
emotional factors such as worry and self-confidence, use cognitive-behavioural techniques 
to indirectly reduce the prevalence of hypothesised maintenance factors and the impact of 
the delusion (e.g. Freeman, Waite et al., 2015; Waller et al., 2015). Mehl et al. (2015) 
compared these causal-interventionist approach therapies (k = 4) with first-generation 
studies and, at end of treatment, found a small to medium effect in favour of the newer 
interventions. Furthermore, Mehl et al. (2015) included studies using causal-interventionist 
therapies specifically tailored to change persecutory delusions but they did not separate 
these from other forms of delusions in their analyses. To date, no meta-analysis has 
specifically evaluated CBTp efficacy by delusion type or focused on persecutory delusions 
alone.  
1.2. Clinical relevance and treatment of persecutory delusions 
Clinically, paranoia and persecutory delusions are most closely associated with a diagnosis 
of psychosis, such as a schizophreniform or delusional disorder. In clinical populations, 
those presenting with paranoid ideation are considered to be at the severe end of the 
spectrum, with the most extreme form of ideation being persecutory delusions. 
Persecutory delusions are beliefs held with high conviction that harm is occurring - or will 
occur - to the individual and that that harm is intended by the persecutor (Freeman and 
Garety, 2000). Persecutory delusions are one of the most common delusions (Cutting, 
1997) and are strongly associated with high levels of distress and with admission to hospital 
(Castle, Phelan, Wessely & Murray, 1994). Evidence also suggests that at the first episode 
of psychosis, over 70% of patients have a persecutory delusion (Coid et al., 2013). In the 
literature, a number of psychological models conceptualise the development and 
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maintenance of paranoid ideation. Three predominant models of persecutory delusions 
exist: as a form of psychological self-esteem defence (Bentall et al., 1994; 2008); ‘poor-me’, 
‘bad-me’ paranoia (Trower and Chadwick, 1995) and the cognitive multi-factorial model 
(e.g. Freeman et al., 2002). These models have highlighted numerous cognitive and 
emotional processes relevant to the phenomenon of clinical paranoia and, in doing so, 
have informed the development of more recent psychological interventions for paranoia.  
Freeman and Garety (2014) reviewed recent developments in understanding and 
treating persecutory delusions. Outside of traditional CBTp given to individuals with 
persecutory delusions, a number of cognitive therapies have more recently been developed 
to target causal and maintenance factors such as worry (Foster et al., 2010; Freeman, Dunn 
et al., 2015), interpersonal sensitivity (Bell and Freeman, 2014; Freeman et al., 2014), 
insomnia (Freeman, Waite et al., 2015; Myers, Startup and Freeman, 2011), and reasoning 
biases (Hepworth, Startup and Freeman, 2011; van Oosterhout et al., 2014; Waller et al., 
2015). These examples are notably developed from the cognitive multi-factorial model of 
persecutory delusions, detailed in Figure 1, which focuses on either key emotional 
processes (worry, interpersonal sensitivity), reasoning biases, or triggers (insomnia). 
Freeman and Garety (2014) note in their review that pilot and RCT studies show initial 
promising results for these interventions. However, to date no systematic, quantitative 
assessment of the efficacy of CBTp for persecutory delusions has been undertaken.  
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 Figure 1: Multifactorial model of the formation of persecutory beliefs (Freeman et al., 2002) 
 
1.3. The importance of treatment feasibility 
The challenge of engaging individuals with psychosis in treatment is well-documented in 
clinical literature (Kreyenbuhl, Nossle & Dixon, 2009; Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 
1998). Evidence suggests that up to 80% are non-adherent to treatment (Corrigan, 
Liberman & Engel, 1990) with an average non-compliance of pharmacology of 42% (Cramer 
& Rosenheck, 1998), albeit such figures may have improved since these studies were 
conducted. More recent research has found an estimated 24% rate of missed medical 
appointments for individuals with psychosis (Kreyenbuhl, Nossle & Dixon 2009) and a poor 
alliance with the therapist in treatment (Lecomte et al., 2008; Priebe, Watts, Chase & 
Matanov, 2005; Young, Grusky, Jordan & Belin, 2000). However, O’Brien, Fahmy & Singh 
(2008) found that, relative to other serious mental illnesses, a diagnosis of schizophrenia is 
associated with lower rates of treatment disengagement. A recent meta-analysis has 
shown that individuals with schizophrenia spectrum disorders have a better rate of 
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engagement in psychosocial treatments compared to psychopharmacology adherence 
(Villeneuve et al., 2010). Analysing 74 RCT studies, they found approximately 13% of 
participants who had agreed to undergo psychological treatment dropped out prior to or 
during therapy. Research has indicated that there is a more severe dropout rate among 
individuals with severe delusions (Lincoln et al., 2014). Although dropout rates were not 
investigated in relation to persecutory delusions, it is possible that the associated 
difficulties of holding a persecutory belief (e.g. high anxiety, distrustfulness, social isolation) 
would contribute to a greater difficulty in engagement.  For example, Lawlor, Hall & Ellett 
(2015) found that individuals with persecutory delusions experienced paranoia towards 
their therapist, both in and between sessions. Although no participants dropped out of 
treatment in this study, feelings of paranoia towards a therapist could undeniably disrupt 
therapeutic engagement, particularly if this is not addressing by the therapist.   
1.4. Review objectives 
To date, no systematic review has investigated the efficacy and feasibility of psychological 
treatments in reducing paranoia in psychosis populations. As such, this review has the 
following research objectives and questions: 
1. Provide a synthesis of the characteristics of psychological treatments (e.g. type of 
intervention, treatment length) impacting on paranoia in psychosis literature to 
date. 
2. What is the feasibility of psychological treatments for paranoia, as measured by 
treatment dropout rates and ratings of usefulness, satisfaction and interest? 
3. What is the efficacy of psychological treatments for paranoia: 
a. At the end-of-treatment and at follow-up? 
b. In terms of overall persecutory delusion severity, frequency and 
endorsement of paranoid ideas and distress associated with such beliefs? 
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c. Is general well-being improved? 
4. Does the intervention change the targeted factors hypothesised to maintain 
paranoia? 
2. Methods 
2.1. Eligibility Criteria  
In order to be included in the qualitative review (feasibility and quality), studies needed to 
meet the following criteria: 1) had to be an evaluation of a psychological intervention, 2) 
report outcome data specific to persecutory delusions i.e. either the sample is broader 
psychosis but paranoia change is measured or the sample is homogeneous with people 
with persecutory delusions, 3) only peer reviewed studies published in the English language 
were included.  
In order for studies to be used in the meta-analysis to investigate efficacy of 
interventions, studies needed to meet the previously mentioned inclusions criteria (criteria 
1-3) and further meet the following inclusion criteria: 4) randomised control trial 5) 
comparing a psychological therapy intervention (individual or group), 6) treatment as usual 
(TAU) or another active control intervention (e.g. peer support). 
2.2. Information sources 
Relevant studies were identified by an electronic database search using three databases: 
EMBASE, PUBMED and PSYCHinfo from 1987 to 14th December 2015 in English. Published 
meta-analysis and reviews were also searched. Within each of these databases three 
searches were conducted and combined. 
2.3. Search 
The first terms searched in the databases were “psychosis” OR “persecutory delusion*” OR 
“paranoi*”. Next, databases were searched on the terms “cognitive therapy” OR “cognitive 
behaviour therapy” OR “cognitive behaviour therapy” OR “cognitive behavioural therapy” 
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OR “cognitive behavioural therapy” OR “mindfulness” OR “group therapy” OR “group 
intervention”. Following this, databases were search for the terms “RCT” OR “randomised 
control trial” OR “randomized control trial” OR “pilot study” OR “case study”. Finally, all 
three searches were combined using the operator AND, which yielded 950 studies. The 
removal of duplicates narrowed the search to 672 studies (see flow chart depicted on 
Figure 2). Three further studies were added from other sources, resulting in a final total of 
675 studies.  
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Figure 2: Flow chart of selected studies 
2.4. Study Selection 
All papers were screened on titles and abstracts. Seventy-six full texts were read and 
assessed for eligibility. Twenty-three studies fulfilled the criteria and were ultimately 
included for the quantitative synthesis of the review. Of the excluded studies, 41 did not 
specify delusions as paranoid or use a specific measure of paranoia, 5 were not 
intervention papers (e.g. correspondence papers), 3 did not use standardised measures to 
monitor paranoia, 2 did not give a measure of change and 2 did not include participants 
who met the diagnostic criteria. 
Of the 23 eligible studies included in the qualitative review, 6 studies were 
identified as eligible for meta-analysis (see Table 1c). All studies not included in the meta-
analysis were excluded due to a lack of comparison group. It should be noted that one 
study (Chadwick et al., 2009) was included in the qualitative review as the majority (86%) 
were identified as suffering from paranoia. However, despite having a comparison group, 
this study was excluded from the meta-analysis on the basis that the study did not have a 
follow-up and it reported mean (pre-post) change rather than group means and standard 
deviations. 
2.5 Quality assessment 
Quality of treatment and quality of methodology were coded by the author using a quality 
rating scale developed by Yates et al. (2005) (see Appendix 1). This rating scale was 
selected as it was specifically designed for assessing quality of randomised controlled trials 
for psychological treatment and is evidenced to have good reliability and validity (Yates et 
al., 2005). It also provides two subscales – one of treatment quality and – one of quality of 
study design and methods. These can be combined to give an overall score of quality. The 
scale has a maximum total quality score of 35, which is subdivided into a maximum 
treatment quality score of 9 and a maximum design and methods quality score of 26. 
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Whilst some of the studies assessed in this review are not randomised controlled trials, the 
majority of scale items are equally applicable to non-randomised studies and thus the scale 
was deemed to be a valid comparison tool.  
Feasibility of psychological interventions for paranoia was predominantly assessed 
using the reported dropout rates prior to or during treatment as a measure of engagement 
in treatment. Where reported, feasibility was also assessed using participants’ feedback on 
the usefulness, and of their interest, enjoyment and satisfaction, of the intervention. 
2.6 Assessment of efficacy of treatment 
2.6.1. Meta-analyses 
Statistical analyses were carried out in Review Manager (Version 5.3). Bias-corrected 
standardised mean difference (d) were calculated on all outcome measures for every 
intervention-control group comparison using pooled standard deviation as the standardiser 
(Hedges and Olkin, 1985). A positive sign for d indicates that the intervention group 
showed greater improvement after treatment than the control condition. Effect sizes were 
calculated based on post-treatment data and follow-up data in order to estimate the long-
term effects of treatment. 
Homogeneity of effect size was not assumed because the studies differ in various 
ways (e.g. duration of treatment, format of therapy, measurement tool). Hence, a random-
effects model was fitted to the data to allow for variation in the true effect sizes (δi). 
Heterogeneity was calculated using χ2 tests and the I2 statistic was reported. When I2 = 0%, 
25%, 50% or 75%, then no, low, moderate and high heterogeneity must be assumed 
(Higgins, Thompson, Deeks & Altman, 2003).  
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2.6.1.1. Paranoia assessment 
2.6.1.1.1. Overall severity and distress associated with persecutory delusions 
The most commonly used measure of paranoia severity was the delusion subscale of the 
Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale (PSYRATS-D) (Haddock et al., 1999). The scale is largely 
clinician-led, measuring delusions across six dimensions: amount of preoccupation, 
duration of preoccupation, conviction, disruption, amount of distress and intensity of 
distress. Five out of the six studies report a total PSYRATS D score as a primary measure of 
change in persecutory delusion. Waller et al. (2015) used visual analogue scales (VAS) (scale 
1-100) for three dimensions of persecutory delusions: conviction, distress and 
preoccupation. This data was used for the primary meta-analysis investigating efficacy of 
psychological treatment in reducing paranoia. Where subscale data was reported, sum 
scores and pooled variance were calculated. Studies reporting subscale data for distress 
(Foster et al., 2010; Freeman et al. 2015 and Waller et al., 2015) were used to estimate an 
effect size of changes in distress. 
2.6.1.1.2. Endorsement of persecutory ideation 
Three studies also measured change in paranoia using Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale 
(GPTS) (Green et al., 2008). The GPTS is a self-report tool which measures ideas of social 
reference, persecutory ideas and associated distress. It has been shown to have good 
reliability, validity and sensitivity to clinical change and thus warrants inclusion in this 
review as a secondary measure of change in paranoia. The GPTS differs conceptually from 
the PSYRATS-D in that it predominantly measures frequency and the endorsement of 
paranoid ideas held, either in the context of social referencing (part A; e.g. “People have 
been dropping hints for me”) or persecution (part B; e.g. “Certain individuals have had it in 
for me”). 
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2.6.1.2. Causal and maintenance factors 
As all studies included in the meta-analysis used interventions designed from a causal-
interventionist approach, all interventions targeted a maintenance factor of paranoia. The 
targeted maintenance factors and associated measuring tools for each study are detailed in 
Table 1c. These measures were used to calculate the efficacy of interventions in improving 
the targeted maintenance factors of paranoia. All studies used measures in which a 
decreasing score indicates improvement with the exception of one study (Waller et al., 
2015) which used a measure with an increasing score indicating improvement. To allow for 
this in the analysis, group means and standard deviations for Waller et al. (2015) were 
switched between the intervention and control groups in the calculations.  
2.6.1.3 Well-being 
Three studies included in the meta-analyses measured change in well-being using the 
Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS) (Tennant et al., 2007). This tool 
assesses well-being over the past fortnight across fourteen items such as ‘I’ve been feeling 
cheerful’ and ‘I’ve been feeling good about myself’. The scale has high test-retest reliability 
and criterion validity. Analyses were conducted to evaluate the efficacy of these 
interventions in improving well-being at end-of-treatment and at follow-up.  
2.6.2. Efficacy of pilot and case studies 
Studies excluded from the meta-analyses were assessed for observed changes in paranoia 
and other psychological factors measured within the studies. Observed change was 
predominantly assessed by comparing scores on pre- and post-intervention measures, 
factoring in change at follow-up where applicable. In a small number of studies, qualitative 
evidence of change was found in narrative descriptions of outcomes.  
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3. Results 
3.1. Characteristics of psychological treatments impacting on paranoia  
Of the 23 studies identified that evaluated psychological interventions treating individuals 
with paranoia, 10 were case studies or case series, 5 were non-randomised pilot studies 
and 7 were RCTs (see Tables 1a, 1b and 1c).  All interventions were individualised, with the 
exception of two studies which delivered a mindfulness group intervention and a 
metacognitive training group programme (Chadwick et al., 2009; van Oosterhout et al., 
2014). The majority of the studies were conducted in the UK and almost half (47.8%) were 
conducted by the same research group (Bell & Freeman, 2014; Freeman et al., 2014; 
Freeman et al., 2016; Freeman, Dunn et al., 2015; Freeman, Waite et al., 2015; Freeman, 
Waller et al., 2015; Foster et al., 2010; Hepworth, Startup & Freeman, 2011; Myers, Startup 
& Freeman, 2011; Waller et al., 2011; Waller et al., 2015). 
Across the 23 studies, the number of therapy sessions ranged from 1 to 38 
sessions. The average number of sessions was 10.5 (SD 9.61), with a median of 7 sessions 
and mode of 6 sessions. The length of interventions ranged (in weeks) from 1 (for a one-off 
intervention) to 78, with an average length of 13.7 weeks (SD 16.76), and a median and 
mode of 8 weeks.  
Seven studies used individually tailored formulation-based therapy. Interventions 
included four ‘classic’ CBTp (including normalisation, belief modification and reality testing) 
(Carden & Jones, 2009; Chadwick & Tower, 1996; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997; Kuller & 
Björgvinsoon, 2010; Morrison, 2004); a third-wave intervention i.e. acceptance and 
commitment therapy (ACT) (Bloy, Oliver and Morris, 2011); and a CBT for dog phobia and 
agoraphobia (Dudley, Dixon and Turkington, 2005).  
Sixteen of the interventions were manualised interventions. Two studies were 
manualised mindfulness interventions (Chadwick et al., 2009; Ellett, 2013). All other studies 
used interventionist-causal model approaches, targeting a specific causal and maintenance 
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factor of persecutory delusions. Six studies used variants of metacognitive therapy, 
specifically targeting reasoning biases associated with persecutory delusions (e.g. jumping 
to conclusions, belief inflexibility) (Balzan & Gallelty, 2015; Hepworth, Startup and 
Freeman, 2011; Hutton, Morrison and Wardle, 2014; van Oosterhout et al., 2014; Waller et 
al., 2011; Waller et al., 2015). Other studies used brief interventions targeting: worry 
(Foster et al., 2010; Freeman, Dunn et al., 2015); interpersonal sensitivity (Bell and 
Freeman, 2014); insomnia (Freeman, Waite et al., 2015; Myers, Startup and Freeman, 
2011); anxiety in urban environments (Freeman, Waller et al., 2015); and negative self-
beliefs (Freeman et al., 2014). The most recent study (Freeman et al., 2016) delivered a 
lengthier intervention that allowed participants to combine brief modules in improving 
issues with worry, sleep, self-confidence, reasoning processes and safety behaviours, based 
on their individual needs.  
Eleven of the studies identified come from the same research group: the Oxford 
Cognitive Approaches to Psychosis (O-CAP), led by Professor Daniel Freeman. Of these, five 
are RCTs used in the meta-analysis of this review. This research group focus much of their 
research on investigating their cognitive model of persecutory delusions and developing 
therapeutic interventions based on hypothesised mechanisms of paranoia (Freeman et al., 
2002). 
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Table 1a: Case studies/series included in the qualitative synthesis of psychological interventions treating paranoia 
Author and Year N/Diagnoses/Age Type of intervention Duration of 
intervention 
Number of sessions; 
session duration 
Follow-up Primary outcome 
measure 
Balzan & Galletly (2015) 2 males  
Diagnoses: 1 SCZ; 1 DD  
Age: 25.5 (7.8) 
Individual metacognitive therapy (MCT+) 5 weeks 5 sessions; 90-
120mins 
6 weeks PSYRATS-D 
Bloy, Oliver & Morris (2011) 1 male 
Diagnosis: POS 
Age: 32 
Individual Acceptance & Commitment Therapy (ACT) 8 months 27 sessions; 60 mins  None PSYRATS-D 
Carden & Jones (2009) 1 male 
Diagnosis: SCZ 
Age: 32 
Individual CBTp (including normalisation, belief modification, reality 
testing) 
18 months Not reported None PSYRATS-D 
Chadwick & Trower (1996) 1 male 
Diagnosis: SCZ 
Age:31 
CBTp for punishment paranoia (including shared formulation, 
challenging negative self-evaluative beliefs and challenging 
delusions) 
12 weeks 12 sessions; 60mins  1, 3 and 6 
months 
Belief conviction 
and preoccupation 
(%) 
Dudley, Dixon & Turkington (2005) 1 male 
Diagnosis: SCZ 
Age: 38 
CBT for dog phobia and agoraphobia (including systematic 
desensitisation) 
Not reported 38 sessions  6 months PSYRATS-D 
Ellett (2013) 2 males 
Diagnoses: DD 
Age: 41.5 (10.6) 
Individual mindfulness intervention for paranoid beliefs based on 
manual (Chadwick et al., 2005, 2009) 
8 weeks 8 sessions; 60 mins  5 weeks Belief conviction, 
preoccupation & 
distress (0-10) 
Hutton, Morrison & Wardle (2014) 3 (1 male, 2 female) 
Diagnoses: SCZ 
Age: 43.3 (12.6) 
 
Metacognitive Therapy intervention, based on Wells (2009) 
metacognitive model of GAD, adapted for persecutory delusions. 
3 months 11-13 sessions 3 months PSYRATS-D 
Kinderman & Bentall (1997) 1 male 
Diagnosis: SCZ 
Age: 33 
Attribution therapy: a cognitive-behavioural intervention based on 
the attribution model of paranoid ideation (Bentall, Kinderman & 
Kaney, 1994). 
8 weeks 9 sessions None Paranoia Scale1 
Kuller & Björgvinsoon (2010) 1 male 
Diagnosis: Paranoid SCZ 
Age: 33 
Individualised CBTp (including normalisation, belief modification, 
reality testing) 
30 weeks 30 sessions None Belief conviction 
and preoccupation 
(%) 
Morrison (2004) 1 male 
Diagnosis: DD 
Age: 30 
Individual imagery based cognitive therapy adapted for persecutory 
delusions 
8 weeks 8 sessions 6 weeks PSYRATS-D 
SCZ, Schizophrenia; POS, Psychosis not otherwise specified; DD, Delusional disorder; PSYRATS-D, PSYRATS delusions scale; 1Fenigstein and Vanable (1992) 
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Table 1b: Pilot studies (non-randomised) included in the qualitative synthesis of psychological interventions treating paranoia 
Author and Year N/Diagnoses/Mean age 
(SD) 
Inclusion criteria Type of intervention Duration of 
intervention 
Number/duration 
of sessions 
Blind? Follow-
up 
Intervention 
dropout rate 
Primary 
outcome 
measure 
Bell & Freeman (2014) 11 
Diagnoses: 6 SCZ; 1 DD; 4 
POS  
Age: 38.0 (15.8) 
Current persecutory delusion1; ≥ 
50% delusional belief conviction; 
reporting interpersonal 
sensitivity2; aged 18-65; 1 month 
of medication stability 
Manualised cognitive-behavioural 
intervention targeting interpersonal 
sensitivity 
8 weeks 6 sessions  No 4 weeks 8.33% PSYRATS-D  
GTPS 
Freeman et al. (2016) 11 
Diagnoses: 4 SCZ; 5 SA; 1 
DD; 1 POS 
Age: 41.6 (15.2) 
Current persecutory delusions1; 
aged 18-70 
Individual, modular CBT 
intervention offering treatment 
models targeting sleep, worry, self-
confidence, reasoning processes 
and safety behaviours selected 
preferentially by participant 
6 months 20 sessions 
(average) 
No 1 
months 
8.33% PSYRATS-D 
GTPS 
Freeman, Waller et al. 
(2015) 
15 
Diagnoses: 13 SCZ, 2 SA  
Age: 41.4 (11.2) 
Current persecutory delusions1, 
≥ 50% delusional belief 
conviction; aged 18-65 
One-off computer-based CBT 
intervention entitled "Getting Out 
and About". Psychoeducation 
about anxiety, specifically in urban 
environments and anxiety 
management techniques.  
2-3 hours 1 session; 2-3 
hours duration 
No None 16.67% Belief 
conviction 
and 
distress (%) 
Hepworth, Startup & 
Freeman (2011) 
12 
Diagnoses: 10 SCZ, 2 DD 
Age: 40.3 (11.9) 
Current persecutory delusions1; 
aged 18-65 
Brief cognitive intervention 
"Emotional Processing and 
Metacognitive Awareness (EPMA)". 
Intervention based on numerous 
sources3 
3 weeks 3 sessions, 60 
mins durations 
No 1 month 29.41% PSYRATS-D 
Myers, Startup & 
Freeman (2011) 
15 
Diagnoses: SCZ, SA or DD 
Age: 45.5 (11.3) 
Current persecutory delusions1; 
sleep difficulties lasting for one 
month or longer; 1 month of 
medication stability; aged 18-65 
Individual insomnia CBT 
intervention, manual written based 
on numerous sources4 
4-8 weeks 4 sessions; 60 
mins duration 
No 1 month 0.00% PSYRATS-D 
Waller et al. (2011) 13 
Diagnoses: 7 SCZ; 4 SA; 1 
DD; 1 POS 
Age: 44.6 (10.2) 
Currently persecutory delusions; 
high delusional conviction (> 
75%)  
One-off computerised training  
reasoning biases, termed 
'Maudsley Review Training 
Programme' + 4  CBT sessions 
5 weeks 5: 90 mins 
duration of 
computer training 
+ 4 sessions CBT 
No 1 month 7.14% Delusional 
conviction 
(%) 
SD, Standard deviation; SCZ, Schizophrenia; SA, Schizoaffective disorder; POS, Psychosis not otherwise specified; DD, Delusional disorder; PSYRATS-D, PSYRATS delusions scale; GPTS, Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale; 1 defined by Freeman and 
Garety (2000), present ≥ 6 months; 2 scoring ≥ 95 Interpersonal Sensitivity Measure (IPSM) (Boyce & Parker, 1989); 3 sources include Watkins (2004), Hayes (2005), Segal, Teasdale, Williams & Gemar (2002), and Blackledge (2007); 4sources included 
Espie (2006), Freeman & Freeman (2010), Meir & Kryger (2004) and Harvey, Sharpley, Ree, Stinson & Clark (2007). 
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Table 1c: Randomised Control Trials included in the qualitative synthesis and meta-analyses  
Author 
and Year 
N/Diagnoses/
Mean age 
(SD) 
Inclusion criteria Type of 
control 
Blind? Type of 
Intervention 
Details of 
intervention 
Duration of 
intervention 
Number/ 
duration 
of sessions 
Follow 
up 
Intervention 
dropout 
rate 
ITT? Measure of 
Paranoia 
Targeted 
factor  
Outcome 
measure of 
targeted 
factor 
Chadwick 
et al. 
(2009)1 
22 
Diagnoses: 22 
SCZ, 19 of 
which had 
paranoid 
beliefs 
Age: 41.6 
(8.1) 
Aged 18+ years; 
diagnosed with a 
psychotic disorder; 
prominent, 
distressing voices 
for ≥ 6 months; 
under care of 
secondary mental 
health services 
Waitlist 
n = 11 
Yes Group Group 
mindfulness 
intervention for 
psychosis and 
voices 
n = 15 
10 weeks (5 
weeks bi-
weekly 
session + 5 
weeks of 
practice 
following 
intervention) 
10 
sessions 
None 18.18% No PSYRATS-D Mindful 
response to 
distressing 
thoughts and 
images 
SMQ 
Foster et 
al. (2010) 
24 Diagnoses: 
12 SZ, SA, DD 
Age: EC: 40.0 
(10.5)/ CC: 
39.1 (9.2) 
Current persecutory 
delusion2 for ≥ 6 
months; a clinically 
significant level of 
worry2; aged 18-65. 
TAU 
n = 12 
No Individual Worry-CBT, 
Fixed sessions 
based on a 
therapy manual 
(Wells, 1997) n 
= 12 
4 weeks 4 session; 
60 mins 
4 
weeks 
8.33% No PSYRATS-D 
GPTS 
Worry PSWQ 
Freeman, 
Dunn et 
al. (2015) 
150 
Diagnoses: 
111 SZ; 11 SA; 
10 DD; 18 
POS 
Age: EC: 40.9 
(10.5)/ CC: 
42.1 (13.1) 
Current persecutory 
delusion2 for  ≥ 6 
months; a clinically 
significant level of 
worry3; aged 18-65; 
1 month medication 
stability 
TAU 
n = 77 
Yes Individual Worry-CBT, 
based on self-
help manual 
(Freeman & 
Freeman, 2013) 
n = 73 
8 weeks 6 sessions; 
60 mins 
12 
weeks  
12.33% Yes PSYRATS-D 
GPTS 
Worry PSWQ 
Freeman, 
Waite et 
al. (2015) 
50 
Diagnoses: 33 
SCZ; 10 SA; 7 
POS 
Age: EC: 39.6 
(11.6)/ CC: 
42.4 (13.5) 
Current persecutory 
delusion2 for  ≥ 3 
months; a score of 
at least 2 on the 
distress items of the 
PSYRATS-D; sleep 
difficulties lasting ≥ 
1 month; ISI score ≥ 
15; aged 18–65; 1 
month medication 
stability 
TAU 
n = 26 
Yes Individual Individual 
insomnia CBT 
intervention, 
manual written 
based on 
numerous 
sources8 
n = 24 
12 weeks 8 sessions; 
60 mins 
duration 
12 
weeks 
4.17% Yes PSYRATS-D 
GPTS 
Insomnia ISI 
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Table 1c: continued 
Author 
and Year 
N/Diagnoses/
Mean age (SD) 
Inclusion criteria Type of 
control 
Blind? Type of 
Intervention 
Details of 
intervention 
Duration of 
intervention 
Number/ 
duration of 
sessions 
Follow 
up 
Intervention 
dropout rate 
ITT? Measure of 
Paranoia 
Targeted factor  Outcome 
measure of 
targeted 
factor 
Freeman 
et al. 
(2014) 
30 
Diagnoses: 22 
SZ; 6 SA; 1 DD; 
1 POS 
Age: EC: 40.9 
(10.5)/ CC: 
41.5 (13.1) 
Current persecutory 
delusion2 for  ≥ 3 
months; ≥ 50% 
delusional belief 
conviction; negative 
beliefs about the 
self4; aged 18-70; one 
month medication 
stability 
TAU 
n = 15 
Yes Individual Brief CBT 
targeting 
negative self-
beliefs, based on 
self-help manual 
(Freeman & 
Freeman, 2012) 
n = 15 
8 weeks 6 sessions 12 
weeks 
0.00% Yes PSYRATS-D Negative self-
beliefs 
BCSS 
van 
Oosterho
ut et al. 
(2014) 
154 
Diagnoses: EC: 
52 SCZ; 9 POS, 
3 SA; 11 
Others/ CC I: 
46 SCZ; 9 POS; 
5 SA; 19 
Others 
Age: EC: 38.3 
(11.1)/ CC: 
35.8 (8.7) 
Diagnosed with a 
psychotic disorder5;  
current paranoia 
measured by a GPTS 
score ≥ 50; aged 18–
65 
TAU 
n = 79 
Yes Group Group 
metacognitive 
training 
intervention, 
manual based 
on Moritz (2009)  
n = 75 
8 weeks 8 sessions 16 
weeks 
22.67% Yes PSYRATS-D 
GPTS 
Reasoning 
biases 
MCQ-30 
Waller et 
al. (2015) 
31 
Diagnosis: EC: 
16 SCZ; 2 DD; 
2 SA/ CC I: SCZ 
11 
Age: EC: 39.1 
(10.5)/ CC: 
43.0 (10.7) 
A diagnosis of 
psychosis6; a current 
delusion with 
persecutory content7; 
≥ 50% delusional 
belief conviction; 
rated as distressing 
(>0) on a VAS; aged 
18-65 
TAU 
n = 11 
No Individual Brief, focused 
CBT intervention 
targeting 
reasoning biases 
termed 
'Thinking Well 
(TW)': n = 20 
6 weeks 4 sessions 8 weeks 10.00% Yes Delusional 
conviction, 
distress and 
preoccupation 
(%) 
Reasoning 
biases (belief 
flexibility and 
jumping to 
conclusions) 
1 item from 
MADS 
measuring 
belief 
flexibility 
(%) 
SD, Standard deviation; ITT, Intention to treat; EC, Experimental condition; CC, Control condition; SCZ, Schizophrenia; SA, Schizoaffective disorder; POS, Psychosis not otherwise specified; DD, Delusional disorder; VAS, Visual analogue scale; TAU, Treatment as 
usual; PSYRATS-D, PSYRATS delusions scale; GPTS, Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale; SMQ, Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire (Chadwick et al., 2008); PSWQ, Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990); ISI, Insomnia Severity Scale (Bastien, 
Vallières & Morin, 2001); BCSS, Brief Core Schema Scale (Fowler et al., 2006); MCQ-30, Meta-cognitive Questionnaire 30 (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004); MADS, Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule (Wessely et al., 1993); 1study excluded from meta-
analyses; 2defined by Freeman and Garety (2000); 3indicated by a PSWQ score ≥ 45; 4as indicated by endorsing at least one negative schematic belief on BCSS; 5according to the DSM-IV schizophrenia spectrum (APA, 2000); 6according to ICD-10, F20-29 
'Schizophrenia Spectrum Psychosis' 7assessed using Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN, Wing et al., 1990); 8Espie (2006), Freeman & Freeman (2010), Meir & Kryger (2004) and Harvey et al. (2007) 
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3.2. Quality of the included studies 
Assessment of the quality of studies included in this review (detailed in Table 2) showed 
that the overall quality of studies’ scores ranged from 10 to 34. The average total quality 
score of studies was 20.1 (SD 7.57), indicating an overall moderate quality of studies. 
Quality of treatment was generally high, with an average score of 7.0 (SD 1.45) within a 
score range of 0 to 9. Quality scores of study design and methods were generally moderate 
to high, with an average score of 13.1 (SD 6.63) and a range of 6 to 25. In particular, RCTs 
had good quality of treatment and methodology. This is in comparison to van der Gaag et 
al. (2013), who used the Clinical Trials Assessment Measure (CTAM; Tarrier & Wykes, 2004), 
who found three of the ten studies included were of “inferior quality”.  
More detailed assessment of individual items (see Appendix 2) reveals that 
treatment quality was generally high across all studies. In particular, studies scored 
consistently highly in detailing treatment content, quality of therapist training (almost 
exclusively given by trained clinical psychologists) and evidencing patient engagement. 
Lower scores in treatment quality were largely due to a lack of manualisation or lack of 
evidence for adhering to a treatment manual (Bloy, Oliver & Morris, 2014; Chadwick & 
Torwer, 1996; Carden & Jones, 2009; Dudley, Dixon & Turkington, 2005; Kinderman & 
Bentall, 1997). 
Quality scores for design and methodology approximately grouped studies into 
RCTs (scoring highest), pilot studies and case studies (scoring lowest), as was to be 
expected. Understandably, pilot and case studies had low scores for controlling for bias 
(e.g. randomisation, blinding, allocation bias etc.) and statistical analyses (e.g. power 
calculations, statistical report etc.). Most studies scored highly for justification and validity 
of outcomes. The range observed in RCT quality scores was largely due to variation in 
controlling for bias e.g. blindness (Foster et al., 2010; Waller et al., 2015), and statistical 
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power (Freeman et al., 2014; Freeman, Waite et al., 2015; Waller et al., 2015). Of particular 
note, Freeman et al. (2014) and Waller et al. (2015) showed moderate to large effects sizes 
of their interventions in reducing paranoia but lacked power and Waller et al. (2015) also 
used un-blinded assessors.  
Table 2: Quality scores of included studies (order by total score, highest-lowest) 
Author and Year Type of 
study 
Type of intervention Treatment 
Quality 
Score (0-9) 
Quality of 
study 
design and 
methods 
(0-26) 
Total 
quality 
score 
(0-35) 
Van Oosterhout et al. (2014) RCT Group Metacognitive Training (MCT) 9 25 34 
Freeman, Dunn et al. (2015) RCT Individual CBT for worry 9 24 33 
Freeman, Waite et al. (2015) RCT Individual CBT for insomnia 9 22 31 
Freeman et al. (2014) RCT Individual CBT for self-esteem 8 22 30 
Chadwick et al. (2009) RCT Group mindfulness 6 20 26 
Foster et al. (2010) RCT Individual CBT for worry 6 20 26 
Waller et al. (2015) RCT Individual Computerised + therapist 
delivered CBT for reasoning biases 
8 18 26 
Bell & Freeman (2014) Pilot Individual IPS CBT 8 15 23 
Myers, Startup & Freeman 
(2010) 
Pilot Individual CBT for insomnia 8 15 23 
Freeman et al. (2016) Pilot Individual, module CBT 8 13 21 
Hepworth, Startup & 
Freeman (2011) 
Pilot Individual Emotional Processing and 
Metacogntive Awareness 
8 13 21 
Freeman, Waller et al. (2015) Pilot One-off computer-based 
psychoeducation + 4 sessions CBT 
7 10 17 
Hutton, Morrison & Wardle 
(2014) 
Case series Individual Metacognitive Therapy 7 10 17 
Waller et al. (2010) Pilot Individual computerised CBT for 
reasoning biases 
6 11 17 
Morrison (2010) Case Individual Imagery CBTp  7 8 15 
Balzan & Galletly (2015) Case series Individual MCT CBT 7 7 14 
Bloy, Oliver & Morris (2011) Case Individual ACT 5 8 14 
Ellett (2013) Case series Individual mindfulness 8 6 14 
Carden & Jones (2009) Case Individual CBTp 4 7 11 
Chadwick & Trower (1996) Case Individual CBTp 6 5 11 
Kinderman & Bentall (1997) Case Individual Attribution Therapy 6 5 11 
Kuller & Björgvinsson (2010) Case Individual CBTp 7 4 11 
Dudley, Dixon & Turkington 
(2005) 
Case Individual CBT (systematic 
desensitization) 
4 6 10 
 
3.3. Feasibility  
As 10 of the studies were case studies, intervention dropout rates for these studies did not 
apply and were therefore not included in the evaluation of intervention feasibility. Of the 
thirteen studies that could be included, the average proportion of individuals who dropped 
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out of the evaluated intervention was 11.2% (SD 8.59). The range of intervention dropout 
rates was 0%-29.41%.  
Closer inspection of dropout rates highlighted that two of the three studies with 
the highest intervention dropout rates (van Oosterhout et al., 2014; Chadwick et al., 2009) 
were the two group interventions, with respective dropout rates of 22.7% and 18.1%. 
Evaluating the dropout rates of individualised treatments alone suggested an average 
attrition of 9.5%, skewed by one particular study (Hepworth, Startup and Freeman, 2011) 
which had a disproportionately high dropout rate of 29.4%. Excluding this study reduces 
the average attrition rate for individual interventions to 7.5%.  
Studies with interventions targeting insomnia (Myers, Startup and Freeman, 2011; 
Freeman, Waite et al., 2015) had notably low dropout rates of 0.0% and 4.2%, respectively. 
An intervention targeting negative self-belief (Freeman et al., 2014) also had no 
participants drop out of treatment. Although studies reporting dropout rates were largely 
briefer in length, there does not appear to be a distinct relationship between treatment 
length or number of sessions and attrition in treatment conditions. 
Eight studies gave details of patient feedback about the interventions. Feedback 
was operationalised in various ways, largely categorisable into usefulness of treatment, 
interest in the intervention, enjoyment of the intervention, and satisfaction with treatment 
(see Table 3). Feedback was positive in all studies, with satisfaction and usefulness ratings 
being notable high across numerous interventions. Of note, all studies which reported 
feedback delivered interventions that either indirectly addressed paranoia or directly 
addressed paranoia without challenging the delusions (Bloy, Oliver & Morris, 2011). 
However, no studies report requesting specific recommendations from participants to 
improve the inventions. 
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Table 3: Intervention feedback from participants 
 
Usefulness Interest Enjoyment Satisfaction  
Bell & Freeman (2014) ++ NR NR ++ 
Bloy, Oliver & Morris (2011) NR NR NR ++ 
Freeman et al. (2016) NR NR NR ++ 
Freeman, Dunn et al. (2015) NR NR NR + 
Freeman, Waller et al. (2015) ++ NR ++ ++ 
Van Oosterhout et al. (2014) NR NR + ++ 
Waller et al. (2010) ++ ++ ++ NR 
Waller et al. (2015) + NR + NR 
++, high ratings reported; + positive feedback reported; NR, not reported 
 
3.3. Efficacy of treatment 
3.3.1. Efficacy of pilot and case studies 
Across the studies not included in the meta-analyses, Table 4 depicts observed changes in 
persecutory delusions and other psychological factors. Only a small number of studies 
evaluated the same outcome with the exception of overall improvements in persecutory 
delusions and conviction of persecutory belief. 
With the exception of two studies (Chadwick et al., 2009; Carden & Jones, 2009), 
improvements in some aspects (e.g. conviction, preoccupation, distress) if not overall 
improvement in persecutory delusions were observed. In particular, all studies measuring 
associated distress reported improvements. Where reported, improvements in other 
psychological factors were also observed in the majority of studies. This was particularly 
observed in overall symptoms of psychosis and cognitive factors, albeit the latter factors 
were largely being targeted by the intervention and hence were reported as outcomes e.g. 
worry. Observed changes in affect were less consistent – approximately half of the studies 
measuring affect reported improvements in depression (Bloy, Oliver & Morris, 2011; 
Chadwick & Trower, 1996; Ellett, 2013; Hepworth, Startup & Freeman, 2010; Myers, 
Startup & Freeman, 2010) whilst the majority of studies measuring anxiety found no 
change in outcome (Carden & Jones, 2009; Freeman, Waller et al., 2015; Hepworth, Startup 
& Freeman, 2011; Hutton, Morrison & Wardle, 2014). Some studies reported 
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improvements in social functioning and well-being but there was no evidence for 
improvement in clinical functioning. Notably, no studies reported worsening of persecutory 
delusions or any other psychological factor. 
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Table 4: Observed changes in paranoia and other psychological factors in pilot and case studies 
  
Persecutory Delusions Symptoms of psychosis Affect Cognitive Functioning 
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Bell & Freeman (2014) +                           +                     
Chadwick et al. (2009)1 =                 =                   =       =   
Freeman, Waller et al. (2015) = =   +                 =                         
Freeman et al. (2016) + +   +   +                   + + +     + +     + 
Hepworth, Startup & Freeman 
(2011) + = = +               + =       +   =             
Myers, Startup & Freeman (2010) +         +         + + +                 +       
Waller et al. (2010)   +                           =   +               
                                                     
C
as
e
 s
tu
d
ie
s 
Balzan & Galletly (2015) + + +     + + =   +           +   +               
Bloy, Oliver & Morris (2011) +                     +                     +     
Carden & Jones (2009) = = =                 = =                         
Chadwick & Trower (1996)   +                   +                           
Dudley, Dixon & Turkington 
(2005) + + + + + +       +       +                       
Ellett (2013)   + + + +             + +             +           
Hutton, Morrison & Wardle 
(2014) +           + + = +   = =       =             =   
Kinderman & Bentall (1997) +                             +                   
Kuller & Björgvinsson (2010)   + +             +                         +     
Morrison (2010)   + + +                                           
 +, observed improvement; =, no change; 1RCT not included in the meta-analyses due to sample population not all having persecutory delusions and pre-post measures design used rather than control group 
comparison 
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3.3.2. Meta-analyses 
3.3.2.1. Characteristics of studies included in the meta-analyses 
All six studies used manualised interventions that targeted a specific causal or maintenance 
factor of persecutory delusions (please see Table 1c). Only one study used a group 
intervention (van Oosterhout et al., 2014). Two studies (Foster et al., 2010; Freeman, Dunn 
et al., 2015) targeted worry and were a pilot and a larger-scale RCT trial developing the 
same manual. Two studies (van Oosterhout et al., 2014; Waller et al., 2015) targeted 
reasoning biases but had quite different intervention approaches e.g. group vs. individual. 
All studies used treatment as usual (TAU) as their control comparison groups. 
Treatment length ranged from 4 to 12 weeks with an average of 7.67 weeks (SD 
2.66). Number of sessions in an intervention ranged from 4 to 8 with an average of 6 
sessions (SD 1.79). Follow-up periods for studies ranged from 4 to 16 weeks with an 
average follow-up period of 10.67 weeks (SD 4.13). 
3.3.2.2 Efficacy of treatment at reducing paranoia 
3.3.2.2.1. Overall severity of persecutory delusions (PSYRATS D) 
Intervention vs. TAU at end-of-treatment 
Results of the comparison between intervention vs. TAU at end-of-therapy are depicted in 
Figure 3 in the form of a forest plot. The estimated mean effect size of intervention was 
non-significant (k = 6, n = 393; d = 0.27, 95 % CI [-0.09 – 0.63], z = 1.46, p = 0.14).  
The standardised mean difference of groups in most studies favoured intervention, 
however van Oosterhout et al. (2014) and Freeman, Waite et al. (2015) favoured TAU (d = 
0.25 and -0.02 respectively). The medium to high value of I2 = 60% indicates that 
approximately 60% of the observed variance in effect sizes might be due to heterogeneity. 
Sensitivity analysis found that one study (van Oosterhout et al., 2014) had an especially 
large influence on the amount of heterogeneity. If this study is excluded, the proportion of 
observed variance due to real differences in effect size drops to 14% (I2 = 14%). Excluding 
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this study in the model changes the mean effect size to a significant small to medium effect 
size of intervention (k = 5, n = 265; d = 0.38, 95 % CI [0.10 – 0.66], z = 2.62, p = 0.009). 
Figure 3: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at end-
of-therapy in reducing paranoia (PSYRATS D) 
 
Intervention vs. TAU at follow-up 
Results of the comparison between intervention vs. TAU at follow-up are depicted in Figure 
4. The estimated mean effect size was also non-significant (k = 6, n = 376; d = 0.17, 95 % CI 
[-0.18 – 0.52], z = 0.95, p = 0.34).  
The standardised mean difference for half the studies (Foster et al., 2010; Freeman, 
Dunn et al., 2015; Waller et al., 2015) favoured intervention groups. The medium to high 
value of I2 = 58% indicates that approximately 58% of the observed variance in effect sizes 
might be due to heterogeneity. Sensitivity analysis found that one study (Freeman, Dunn et 
al., 2015) had a relatively large influence on the amount of heterogeneity. If this study is 
excluded, a 30% (I2 = 28%) change in observed variance is observed. However, the model 
remains non-significant if this study is excluded and there is no effect of intervention vs. 
TAU on paranoia found (k = 5, n = 236; d = 0.02, 95 % CI [-0.30 – 0.35], z = 0.14, p = 0.89). 
Figure 4: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at 
follow-up in reducing paranoia (PSYRATS D) 
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3.3.2.2.2. Efficacy of reducing distress associated with persecutory delusion 
Intervention vs. TAU at end-of-treatment 
Analysis of the effect of intervention vs. TAU at end-of-therapy found a significant, medium 
to large estimated mean effect of intervention in reducing distress (k = 3, n = 187; d = 0.62, 
95 % CI [0.10 – 1.13], z = 2.74, p = 0.006) (see Figure 5). A low to moderate level of 
heterogeneity was observed (I2 = 40%), where approximately 40% of the observed variance 
in effect sizes may have been due to heterogeneity. Sensitivity analysis found that one 
study (Waller et al., 2015) had influenced all of the observed heterogeneity in effect sizes. 
Excluding this study reduces the estimated mean effect size but the model remains 
significant (k = 2, n = 163; d = 0.39, 95 % CI [0.08 – 0.70], z = 2.46, p = 0.01) with no 
observed heterogeneity of variance (I2 = 0%). This reflects the picture of improvement, 
specifically on the distress levels associated with persecutory delusions, which have been 
observed in non-RCT studies.   
Figure 5: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at end-
of-therapy in reducing distress associated with paranoia 
 
Intervention vs. TAU at follow-up 
Comparison of intervention vs. TAU at follow-up found a significant, medium to large mean 
effect of intervention in reducing distress (k = 3, n = 205; d = 0.56, 95 % CI [0.27 – 0.86], z = 
3.74, p = 0.0002) (see Figure 6). No heterogeneity in the variance of effect sizes was 
observed (I2 = 0%). 
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Figure 6: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at 
follow-up in reducing distress associated with paranoia 
 
3.3.2.2.3. Endorsement of persecutory ideation (GPTS) 
Intervention vs. TAU at end-of-treatment 
Results of using the GPTS as a measure of paranoia for a comparison of intervention vs. 
TAU at end-of-therapy are shown in Figure 7. Analysis found no significant estimated mean 
effect size (k = 4, n = 336, d = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.26 – 0.45], z = 0.52, p = 0.60). A medium to 
high heterogeneity of variance was found (I2 = 55%), suggesting 55% of observed variance 
in effects sizes might be due to heterogeneity. Sensitivity analysis found one study (van 
Oosterhout et al., 2014) influenced all of the heterogeneity observed. This study also has a 
standardised mean difference that favoured the control group (d = -0.25). Excluding this 
study in the analysis finds a significant, small to medium estimated mean effect size (k = 3, 
n = 208; d = 0.31, 95 % CI [0.03 – 0.58], z = 2.21, p = 0.03) with no observed heterogeneity 
in variance of effect sizes (I2 = 0%). 
Figure 7: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at end-
of-therapy in reducing paranoia (GPTS) 
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Intervention vs. TAU at follow-up 
The comparison of GPTS scores between intervention vs. TAU at follow-up is shown in 
Figure 8. The estimated mean effect size found was non-significant (k = 4, n = 317; d = 0.18, 
95 % CI [-0.22 – 0.58], z = 0.89, p = 0.37). Again, heterogeneity of variance in effect size was 
found to be medium to high (I2 = 62%) and sensitivity analysis found the same study (van 
Oosterhout et al., 2014) to be responsible for all 62% of the heterogeneity of variance and 
has a standardised mean difference value favouring TAU (d = -0.27). Excluding the study 
finds a significant, small to medium effect size of intervention on reducing paranoia scores 
(k = 3, n = 205; d = 0.39, 95 % CI [0.11 – 0.66], z = 2.74, p = 0.006) with no observed 
heterogeneity of variance (I2 = 0%). 
Figure 8: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at 
follow-up in reducing paranoia (GPTS) 
 
3.3.2.4. Efficacy of treatment in improving well-being 
Intervention vs TAU at end-of-treatment 
Analysis of the effect of intervention vs. TAU at end-of-therapy found a significant, medium 
estimated mean effect of intervention in improving well-being (k = 3, n = 217; d = 0.50, 95 
% CI [0.16 – 0.84], z = 2.88, p = 0.004) (see Figure 9). A low level of heterogeneity was 
observed (I2 = 24%). 
Figure 9: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at end-
of-treatment in changing well-being  
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Intervention vs TAU at follow-up 
Analysis of the effect of intervention vs. TAU at follow-up also found a slightly smaller, 
significant estimated mean effect of intervention in improving well-being (k = 3, n = 215; d 
= 0.42, 95 % CI [0.15 – 0.69], z = 3.02, p = 0.003) (see Figure 10). A no heterogeneity was 
observed (I2 = 0%). 
Figure 10: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at 
follow-up in changing well-being 
 
3.3.2.5 Efficacy of treatment at reducing maintenance factor of paranoia 
Intervention vs. TAU at end-of-treatment 
The comparison of change in the maintenance factor of paranoia between intervention and 
TAU at end-of-therapy found a significant, medium effect (k = 6, n = 391; d = 0.50, 95 % CI 
[0.06 – 0.95], z = 2.21, p = 0.03) (see Figure 11). High heterogeneity of variance was 
observed in the analysis (I2 = 74%). However, sensitivity analysis found van Oosterhout et 
al. (2014) influenced all of the heterogeneity observed. The standardised mean difference 
observed in this study also favours the control group (d = -0.22). Removing this study from 
the analysis reduced heterogeneity to 0% and increased the size of the significant 
estimated mean effect (k = 5, n = 263; d = 0.65, 95 % CI [0.40 – 0.90], z = 5.07, p < 0.00001). 
Figure 11: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at 
end-of-treatment in changing maintenance factor targeted by the intervention 
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Intervention vs. TAU at follow-up 
Analysis of change in targeted maintenance factors at follow-up found a non-significant 
estimated mean effect of interventions (k = 6, n = 376; d = 0.27, 95 % CI [-0.07 – 0.61], z = 
1.56, p = 0.12) (see Figure 12). Moderate heterogeneity of variance in effects sizes was 
observed (I2 = 55%) however, similarly to the analysis of maintenance factors at end-of-
treatment, removing van Oosterhout et al. (2014) from the analysis reduces the value of I2 
to 0%. This study also has a standardised mean difference which favours the control group 
(d = -0.27). The altered estimated mean effect of intervention then becomes a significant, 
small to medium effect (k = 5, n = 265; d = 0.41, 95 % CI [0.17 – 0.66], z = 3.30, p = 0.001). 
Figure 12: Table and forest plot of effect sizes for the comparison between intervention and TAU at 
follow-up in changing maintenance factor targeted by the intervention 
 
3.3.2.6. Summary of meta-analysis  
Overall, the meta-analyses found that the group intervention (van Oosterhout et al., 2014) 
was not an effective intervention and had a marked impact on the homogeneity of studies. 
Analyses of individual psychological therapies (see Table 5) showed small to medium ES 
improvements across different assessments of paranoia, and most notably with associated 
distress which improved further at follow-up. Improvements observed in overall severity of 
delusions were not sustained at follow-up. Medium to large ES improvements were observed 
in wellbeing and in maintenance factors of paranoia being targeted by interventions. 
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Table 5: Summary of meta-analyses with homogeneous data 
Outcome ES at end of treatment   
d [95% CI] 
ES at follow up 
d [95% CI] 
Severity persecutory delusion (PSYRATS-D) 0.38 [0.1 - 0.66] n.s. 
Distress associated with delusion 0.39 [0.08 – 0.70] 0.56 [0.27 – 0.86] 
Paranoid ideation endorsement (GPTS) 0.31 [0.03 – 0.58]  0.39 [0.11 – 0.66] 
Well-being 0.50 [0.16 – 0.84]  0.42[0.15 – 0.69] 
Maintenance factor of paranoia 0.65 [0.40 – 0.90] 0.41 [0.17 – 0.66] 
n.s. = non-significant 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Overview of findings 
The current review was the first known systematic review of psychological interventions 
impacting upon paranoia that also assessed the feasibility and efficacy of treatments. The 
synthesis of characteristics of psychological treatments found a relatively small number of 
studies specifically reporting change in paranoia, in comparison to a number of studies in 
psychosis literature reporting changes in psychotic symptoms, delusions or hallucinations. 
Almost all interventions were from a CBT approach and individual rather than group 
treatments. These included longer individually tailored formulation-based interventions 
and manualised, causal-interventionist approaches which tended to be briefer in length. 
The assessment of the feasibility of treatments for individuals with paranoia indicated 
relatively good engagement and satisfaction with treatments, particularly with 
interventions targeting insomnia and negative self-belief (Myers, Startup and Freeman, 
2011; Freeman, Waite et al., 2015; Freeman et al., 2014).  
 Meta-analyses of the efficacy of psychological treatments in improving paranoia 
found the group meta-cognitive training intervention to be ineffective (van Oosterhout et 
al., 2014) and contributing to the vast majority of the heterogeneity observed in analyses. 
Further analysis with homogeneous data suggests small to medium effects of individual 
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CBTp in reducing paranoia compared to TAU, however there is mixed evidence for the 
sustainability of these improvements. The current review found small to medium effects of 
CBTp in reducing severity of delusions at end-of-treatment but not at follow-up. Studies 
reporting paranoid ideation endorsement showed small to medium improvements in 
frequency and endorsement of paranoid beliefs at both end-of-treatment and at follow-up. 
Importantly, medium to large effects in improving distress associated with persecutory 
delusions were observed at end-of-treatment and at follow-up.  
 The current review also aimed to assess the efficacy of psychological treatments in 
improving factors relevant to, but distinct from, paranoia i.e. maintenance factors and well-
being. Analyses found individual CBTp to be significantly more beneficial in improving the 
targeted maintenance factor of paranoia compared to TAU at both end-of-treatment and 
at follow-up, implying a relatively good stability in treatment efficacy for these factors. 
These findings suggest that individual CBTp developed from the interventionist-casual 
model approach appears to have a dual efficacy in creating change in maintenance factors 
of persecutory delusions and in reducing paranoia. Individual CBTp was also found to 
significantly improve the well-being of those involved in psychological treatment compared 
to those in TAU. 
4.2. Psychological interventions acceptable for people with persecutory delusions 
The evaluation of the feasibility of current interventions for paranoia suggest promising 
acceptability, particularly for individual CBTp. The average dropout rate of 11.2% suggests 
that sustained engagement in psychological treatment for individuals with paranoia and 
psychosis is similar to psychosocial intervention engagement observed in the general 
psychosis population (13% dropout rate; Villeneuve et al. 2010). This observed dropout 
rate is lower than the attrition rate of 15% for individuals with General Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD) (Hunot, Churchill, Silva de Lima & Teixerira, 2007) and 23% in severe depression 
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(Arnow et al., 2007). In the current review, engagement appears to be good irrespective of 
treatment length, albeit the majority of studies offer briefer treatments.  
Individual CBTp had a noticeably lower attrition rate in comparison to group 
interventions, whereby some studies had no individuals decline or dropout of treatment. In 
general psychotherapy literature, greater dropout rates are observed in group treatments 
compared to individual therapy, with approximately 20 to 50% of client’s terminating group 
therapy early in the treatment (Stone & Rutan, 1984) and an estimated average dropout 
rate of 35% (Bostwick, 1987). It is hypothesised that entering a group process with 
numerous unknown service-users can be extremely threatening for some individuals and 
lead to premature termination of treatment (MacNair & Corazzini, 1994). It is further 
hypothesised that premature terminations may impact on meaningful group work (Yalom, 
1966; 1985) and precipitate a wave of other dropouts (Stone, Blaze & Bozzuto, 1980). 
Dynamics such as these may be particularly relevant for individuals with paranoia. 
Individuals with persecutory delusions are found to have heightened perceptions of social 
threat (Green & Phillips, 2004), selective attention to threat-stimuli (Bentall & Kaney, 
1989), and excessive sensitivity to others’ expressions of negative emotions (Bentall, 
Corcoran, Howard, Blackwood & Kinderman, 2001). It is therefore likely that these 
individuals will find a group scenario more threatening that one-to-one therapeutic 
interactions as there is a greater presence of stimuli that may trigger a perception of 
threat, hence a greater dropout rate is observed.   
Considering the aforementioned heightened sensitivity to threat amongst 
individuals with persecutory delusions, it is perhaps surprising to find a relatively low level 
of treatment attrition in individual interventions. However, it would seem that individuals 
with persecutory delusions, considering the inherently distressing nature of the condition, 
do wish to have access to psychological treatment, equally if not more so than people with 
other mental health conditions. Research in physical illness has identified a number of key 
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appraisals that are linked to uptake of treatment (Weinman, Petrie, Moss-Morris & Horne, 
1996; Hagger & Orbell, 2003; Petrie, Jago & Devcich, 2007). These include beliefs about the 
cause of illness, the length of the prognosis, the severity of the consequences and the 
amount of control the individual has over their illness. Freeman et al. (2013) investigated 
the impact of these beliefs in the uptake of longer-term CBT in a psychosis population. 
Conclusions were tentative due to lack of power but it was suggested that a low sense of 
control and a more biological view of illness was linked with declining therapy, whereas an 
attribution of illness to their personality or state of mind was linked to better uptake of 
CBT. As a number of the interventions identified in the current review targeted problems 
outside of psychosis (e.g. insomnia, worry), it is possible that individuals perceived they had 
more control over such problems and linked this more with their state of mind in 
comparison to their perception about their persecutory beliefs. Furthermore, targeting 
associated difficulties, such as sleep, might facilitate engagement by establishing shared 
therapeutic goals and collaborative working, which are associated with improved 
therapeutic engagement and treatment outcomes (Bachelor, 2013).  
4.3. Efficacy of treatment on a range of paranoia measures and related factors 
Overall, results show that individual CBTp interventions tailored for individuals with 
paranoia are significantly more beneficial in reducing the severity of persecutory delusions 
and endorsement of paranoid ideation than TAU immediately following treatment. The 
mean effect sizes observed are comparable with those seen in other meta-analyses 
evaluating efficacy of CBTp for all delusions (Van der Gaag et al., 2014; Mehl et al., 2015). 
Whilst improvements in the endorsement of paranoid ideation (GPTS) were observable at 
follow-up, improvements in severity of persecutory delusions (PSYRATS-D) were not. 
Importantly, studies reporting change in distress associated with persecutory delusions 
found significant and relatively large effects of interventions in reducing distress at both 
end-of treatment and at follow-up. In keeping with this, significant and sustained 
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improvement in overall well-being was observed in those receiving treatment compared 
with TAU. This is a particularly important finding as research has shown that individuals 
with persecutory delusions have levels of well-being at least one standard deviation below 
that of the normal population (Freeman, Startup et al., 2014).    
The above findings suggest that current interventions targeting paranoia are more 
effective in reducing the level of general paranoid ideation and distress associated with 
paranoid beliefs but are less effective in improving overall severity of persecutory 
delusions. It is possible that the causal-interventionist treatments for paranoia target 
maintenance factors that are more closely related to general paranoid ideation and distress 
than those factors more crucial in severe persecutory delusions. For example, it is 
suggested that the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions are related to 
idiosyncratic negative beliefs about the self (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman & 
Bebbington, 2001). There is also evidence in the literature that persecutory delusions serve 
a defensive explanatory bias which protect an individual from the triggering of negative 
self-schemas that highlight discrepancies between an individual’s ideal-self and actual-self 
(Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994). Potentially, other therapeutic approaches, such as 
longer individually tailored formulation-based CBT or compassion focused therapy, may 
better address individuals’ negative self-schemas and other idiosyncratic maintenance 
factors that could be contributing to the severity of their persecutory delusions. Further 
clinical research is needed to determine the efficacy of other treatment approaches in 
reducing paranoia, particularly outside of causal-interventionist approaches and in 
comparison to active treatment.     
The disparity observed between outcomes in PSYRATS-D and GPTS measures poses 
a question about the current operationalisation of clinically significant change in paranoia. 
PSYRATS-D is a measure developed to assess all forms of delusions (e.g. of grandeur, 
reference, control, persecution etc.) and places an equal importance on the conviction, 
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preoccupation, distress and functional impact of the delusional belief. The measure is also 
predominantly clinician-led rather than self-rated and requires focus on a main belief, 
potentially overlooking whether or not multiple delusions (persecutory or otherwise) are 
held. In contrast, the GPTS is self-rated and specifically focuses on the endorsement of 
multiple ideas of social reference and ideas of persecution, incorporating items that also 
measure associated distress. Whilst this measure may better capture the level of general 
paranoid ideation in an individual, there is also a potential for response bias and an 
omission of measurement of the severity and impact of a specific persecutory delusion. 
This should be considered in future research, and indeed clinical practice, when selecting a 
tool to measure change in paranoia.  
It is important to note that the group meta-cognitive intervention included in the 
initial analysis (van Oosterhout et al., 2014), consistently showed the intervention to be less 
effective than TAU and was responsible for the majority of the heterogeneity in observed 
variance of effect sizes. This was observed despite the study being scored highest on total 
quality. As such, it is reasonable to deduce that the observed outcomes are more 
attributable to the psychological mechanisms of the intervention, rather than faults in 
methodology or treatment quality. Although some evidence exists for the efficacy of MCT 
for individuals with mild delusions (Ferwerda et al., 2010; Moritz et al., 2011), van 
Oosterhout et al. (2014) concluded that MCT interventions may not be effective for 
individuals with moderate to severe delusions. The intervention predominantly uses 
psychoeducation as a mechanism for change, leading the authors to conclude that MCT 
may not elicit the necessary emotional arousal needed to create change in core cognitions 
involved in more severe persecutory delusions. As such, the inefficacy of this intervention is 
likely to be more attributable to the specific content of the treatment, than the fact that it 
was a group intervention. 
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4.4. Strengths and limitations 
Strengths of this review include a rigorous search strategy and application of eligibility 
criteria that allowed for a full picture of the breadth and trends in developments of 
psychological interventions for paranoia. The inclusion of a meta-analysis is a key strength 
of the study as it provides an evaluation of treatment efficacy, using large pooled sample 
sizes, to allow meaningful and statistically viable conclusions to be drawn about the 
efficacy of treatments delivered in RCTs. The quality of studies included in this review was 
generally high in both treatment quality and in design and method, particularly those 
included in the meta-analysis. This allowed more reliable conclusions to be drawn about 
the efficacy and feasibility of treatments and the mechanisms by which outcomes were 
achieved. However, there is a discrepancy in the quality ratings of the studies included in 
the current meta-analysis, which were generally high, compared to those included in van 
der Gaag et al. (2013), a third of which were scored as inferior in quality. This possibly 
questions the validity of the quality scoring of the current review. There was no overlap in 
the studies included in either meta-analysis therefore it is plausible that the studies 
included in van der Gaag et al. (2013) were, overall, lower in quality than those included in 
the current meta-analysis. However, the discrepancy could also be a result of the current 
study using a different quality scoring tool than van der Gaag et al. (2013). Inspection of the 
two measures shows good consistency between the individual scoring items to assess study 
design and methodology quality. However, the Yates et al. (2005) measure places particular 
focus on treatment quality, a rationale for choosing the measure. It is possible that the 
studies included in the current meta-analysis were comparatively higher in quality as their 
ratings incorporated scores for factors such as therapist training, description of treatment 
content and duration, and evidence of treatment engagement.  
A limitation in the meta-analysis was the combining of group and individual 
interventions in the analysis. High heterogeneity in the variance of effects sizes was 
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observed in analyses that included the group intervention RCT (van Oosterhout et al., 
2014). The heterogeneity observed may be due to the dynamics of group intervention 
differing from the dynamics of individual therapy, impacting on treatment outcomes. 
Furthermore, the study population was from a different country (the Netherlands) 
compared to UK populations in the other RCTs. It is likely that some of the heterogeneity 
observed is due to this study being the only RCT conducted outside of the Oxford Cognitive 
Approaches to Psychosis (O-CAP) research group. 
Following this point, it is important to note that almost half of the studies included 
in this review were from the O-CAP research group, led by Professor Daniel Freeman. This 
research group is based in the UK and focus much of their research on investigating their 
cognitive model of persecutory delusions and developing therapeutic interventions based 
on hypothesised mechanisms of paranoia. The majority of the studies from this research 
group use methodology to reduce potential bias (e.g. blinding, study protocols and analysis 
published a priori) and use sample populations from both inner city and rural settings. 
However, this limits the generalisability of findings to other settings and cross-culturally.  
Further limitations also exist when considering the generalisability of conclusions 
drawn. The number of RCTs in the literature was relatively small and all comparison groups 
were TAU. This prevents conclusions being drawn about the specific effects of CBTp for 
paranoia, separate from non-specific effects e.g. therapist attention, expectation of 
benefits. Future research would benefit from more RCTs in CBTp for paranoia that also 
included active control conditions to allow for the efficacy of specific CBTp effects to be 
evaluated. Although studies included sample populations with moderate to severe 
paranoia, it is difficult to entirely generalise findings from controlled clinical trials to routine 
clinical practice when one considers the resources and efforts available in trials to retain 
participation, and the training required for the therapist. Although the manualisation may 
facilitate the application of such interventions in true clinical settings, establishing the 
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effectiveness of these interventions in routine clinical practice will require further 
investigation. 
Finally, it is important to note that many studies were excluded from this review 
because no direct measure of paranoia was given in studies delivering psychological 
therapies for psychosis. Considering that persecutory delusions are present for many 
individuals with psychosis (Freeman & Garety, 2014), routinely measuring change in 
persecutory delusions as an outcome in psychosis treatment trials could elucidate a 
broader understanding of the efficacy of treatment for paranoia in psychosis.   
4.5. Clinical implications 
This review reflects a movement in psychological treatment for paranoia away from more 
traditional individually tailored formulation-based CBTp and towards briefer, manualised 
CBT interventions that target specific causal and maintenance factors of paranoia. This is 
arguably driven by the ongoing development of psychological models of persecutory 
delusions, such as the cognitive multi-factorial model (Freeman et al., 2002) and the fact 
that the research group behind this model have conducted a large proportion of the 
treatment trials in the literature.  
The relatively high number of case studies and pilot trials, particularly those 
published in more recent years, suggests that psychological treatments for paranoia are 
still in the early stages compared to other mental health disorders e.g. depression. Perhaps 
this is, at least in part, driven by a movement away from purely diagnosis-based 
interventions (e.g. CBT for social anxiety, reliving for PTSD) and towards interventions for 
mental health phenomena that either transcend or are not consistently present within 
diagnoses. This seems a particularly important shift in the field of schizophrenia, long-since 
debated to be a heterogeneous condition (e.g. Tsuang, Lyons and Toomey, 1975) with 
specifically identified differences between paranoid and non-paranoid sub-types (Potkin et 
al., 1978; McGuffin, Farmer & Yonace, 1981).  
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The movement towards briefer, manualised therapy for paranoia observed in this 
review may reflect a wider movement in the delivery of CBT in the UK. Considered to have 
progressed in two phases, the original phase saw specialist practitioners deliver bespoked 
CBT to individuals experiencing complex, longer-lasting problems, characterised by high-
quality services delivered to a few, with long waiting lists. Accordingly, a number of the 
older case studies in this review reflect this style of treatment. In order to increase service-
users access to CBT, a second phase has introduced a stepped-care approach that 
separates ‘high’ and ‘low’ intensity CBT, provided by practitioners with various levels of 
training. Lower intensity interventions generally target mild to moderate severities of 
mental health disorders; they are briefer and delivered in many formats (e.g. individual, 
self-help, computerised, group interventions) in order to similarly increase both access and 
choice (Williams and Martinez, 2008). A considerable number of studies in this review, 
particularly those that are more recent, are showing attempts to develop these types of 
low-intensity interventions for complex, severe and enduring mental health disorders (i.e. 
persecutory delusions), perhaps suggesting that a third phase in CBT delivery may be 
emerging. 
The findings of this review provide a tentative but hopeful outlook for the 
successful delivery of CBTp for paranoia in true clinical settings.  As previously discussed, 
persecutory delusions are considered one of the most debilitating yet common disorders in 
psychosis populations. Evidence for effective treatments with which such individuals 
engage well is a promising development within clinical psychology and could potential have 
wider, positive implications on mental health services e.g. reduced hospital admissions, 
reduced reliance on community-based services. It could also stand to improve current 
treatments available for individuals experiencing paranoia outside of schizophreniform 
disorders e.g. borderline personality disorder (Zanarini, Gunderson & Frankenburg, 1990), 
PTSD (Sautter et al., 2005). The apparent efficacy and feasibility of numerous shorter, 
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manualised CBTp interventions could stand to increase the availability and choice service-
users suffering with paranoia have with regards to psychological interventions. 
Finally, there are also implications on the current NICE guidelines (NICE, 2014) 
which recommend a minimum of 16 sessions of individually-tailored CBTp for service-users 
with psychosis. Currently, these guidelines do not make any specific recommendation for 
the treatment of persecutory delusions. In time, a revision to the guidelines to specify 
treatments for paranoia may be warranted. For this to occur justifiably, future research 
would need to concentrate on further establishing the efficacy of CBTp for paranoia, to 
clarify the operationalisation of ‘recovery’ from paranoia and to tighten our understanding 
of the mechanisms that underpin it. The more general growing body of evidence for low-
intensity CBTp may also warrant its inclusion as a recommended treatment for psychosis in 
the near future. However, replication of studies in different settings and by independent 
research groups is needed in order to confirm the efficacy of brief CBTp, particularly for 
persecutory delusions. Future research in CBTp for paranoia should also consider the 
implementation of interventions (e.g. low-intensity, manualised vs longer, individualised 
CBT) and the feasibility of their application in mental health services.  
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Abstract 
 
Aims: Research into interpersonal processes involved in paranoia remains limited. This study 
aimed to assess the feasibility of using interactive virtual reality in a clinical sample with 
psychosis and persecutory delusions. The study aimed to replicate an experiment which found 
healthy individuals high in paranoia showed a hypersensitivity to contingent behaviour which 
increased their perceived trust towards the avatar. A further aim was to investigate the impact 
of self-focused attention on the perception of interpersonal contingency and trust.    
Method: Eighteen male participants with psychosis and paranoia completed the virtual reality 
exercise. Participants entered a virtual flat and interviewed a virtual flatmate whose non-verbal 
responses were either high or low in contingency in relation to the participant. Trust towards 
the avatar was measured by self-report and behaviour towards the virtual flatmate, 
operationalised as interpersonal distance. Focus of attention, affect and immersion in the 
virtual reality scenario were assessed.   
Results: Overall, participants enjoyed and were immersed in the interactive virtual reality 
environment. Interpersonal distance was predicted by severity of persecutory delusions and 
negative affect. Exploratory graphic analyses showed no evidence of hypersensitivity to avatar 
contingency or moderating effect of self-focus attention. Persecutory delusion severity was 
associated with other-focus attention, which in turn, unexpectedly, predicted higher self-
focused attention.  
Conclusions: Interactive virtual reality is a safe and feasibility research tool for individuals with 
clinical paranoia. Severity of persecutory delusions, rather than environmental manipulation, 
predicted trust.  However, the lack of power in the current study prevents clear conclusions 
about the impact of interpersonal contingency on trust in clinical paranoia from being drawn. 
Replication is required with a larger sample and a more ambiguous scenario. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Paranoia 
Paranoid thinking is a phenomenon shown to occur in both general and clinical populations 
(e.g. Freeman et al., 2005). Whilst previously perceived to be limited to delusional 
presentations seen in psychiatric services, a growing body of literature supports the 
conceptualisation of paranoia as a continuum (e.g. Chapman & Chapman, 1980; Claridge, 
1997; van Os et al., 2009). In non-clinical populations, suspicious thoughts are found to be a 
relatively common occurrence, particularly with regards to social evaluative concerns e.g. 
fears of rejection (Freeman et al., 2005). In clinical populations, those presenting with 
paranoid ideation are considered to be at the severe end of the spectrum, the most 
extreme form being persecutory delusions. Persecutory delusions are strongly held beliefs 
that harm is occurring, or will occur, to the individual and that harm is intended by the 
persecutor (Freeman & Garety, 2000).  
 Persecutory delusions are one of the most common delusions (Cutting, 1997), strongly 
associated with high levels of distress and admission to hospital (Castle et al., 1994). Given 
the clinical relevance of researching paranoia, a number of psychological models 
conceptualising paranoia have been put forward. The cognitive model of persecutory 
delusions (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler & Bebbington, 2002) proposes that a number 
of key mechanisms contribute to the formation and maintenance of paranoid ideation 
including negative beliefs about the self and others, self-esteem, jumping to conclusions 
data gathering bias and safety behaviours which prevent disconfirmation of persecutory 
beliefs. Attributional biases (Kaney & Bentall, 1989; Kinderman & Bentall, 1994) and Theory 
of Mind (ToM) deficits (Corcoran & Frith, 1996) have also been long linked to paranoia. An 
investigation using structural equation modelling revealed that paranoid delusions were 
predicted by a wide range of hypothesised cognitive and emotional processes (Bentall et al, 
2009). Since, in parallel with proposals for interpersonal conceptualisation of psychosis 
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(Berry, Barrowclough & Wearden, 2007; Bentall et al., 2014), growing evidence is building 
for the role of social anxiety (e.g. Birchwood et al., 2007; Michail & Birchwood, 2009; 
Michail & Birchwood, 2013; Rietdijk et al., 2009; Voges & Addington, 2005). 
1.2. Social anxiety and paranoia 
Epidemiological studies have found the rate of co-morbid social anxiety disorder in 
individuals with schizophrenia to range between 13%-39% (Kendler et al., 1995b; Cosoff & 
Hafner, 1998; Cassano et al., 1999; Bermanzohn et al., 2000). This is compared to a notably 
lower 6.8% prevalence of social anxiety found in the general population (Kessler et al., 
2005b). A key feature of social anxiety is the expectation of embarrassment and negative 
appraisals from others. Several studies have indicated that intense social anxiety can lead 
to the anticipation of catastrophic loss of social status, resulting in the conviction that 
others mean harm (Michail & Birchwood, 2009; Birchwood et al., 2007). As such, theories 
have emerged to suggest that social anxiety may be an independent route to paranoia or it 
may interact with other mechanistic pathways such as deficits in theory of mind (Lysaker et 
al., 2010; Brüne, 2005). Whilst Lysaker et al. (2010) do not suggest that all cases of clinical 
paranoia are a product of social anxiety, they propose that a subset of this clinical 
population have significant levels of social anxiety which contributes to the occurrence of 
their paranoid ideation. 
1.3. Social anxiety, self-focused attention and interpersonal experiences 
Defined as “an awareness of self-relevant, internally generated information”, self-focused 
attention is proposed to play an important role in numerous pathological conditions 
including social anxiety and schizophrenia (Ingram, 1990). The subject of self-focus can 
include physiological information, thoughts, emotions, personal beliefs and attitudes and 
has been shown to be exacerbated by physiological arousal and negative mood states 
(Wegner & Giuliano, 1980; Hackman, Clark & McManus, 2000). Clark & Wells’ (1995) model 
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of social anxiety theorises that self-focused attention is a maintenance factor in the 
condition as it increases access to negative thoughts and affect, interferes with 
performance and prevents individuals from focusing on external information that might 
disconfirm their beliefs driving the distress. Research has shown that high socially anxious 
and  socially phobic individuals, while in a social situation, display higher levels of self-
reported self-focused attention than participants scoring lower on these measures (Bögels 
& Lamers, 2002, Bögels et al., 2002). Experimental studies have shown that greater self-
focused attention correlates with higher levels of state anxiety in social situations for both 
clinical and non-clinical populations (Woody & Rodriguez, 2000; Woody, 1996). Self-
focused attention also influences an individual’s information processing in social 
interactions as shown by the association between high social anxiety correlates, greater 
self-focused attention and poorer memory for details of recent social interactions (Daly et 
al, 1989; Hope, Heimberg & Klein, 1990; Kimble & Zehr, 1982). This suggests that self-
focused attention creates a deficit in the processing of external social information, resulting 
in lower other-focused attention, and therefore individuals are less able to utilise objective 
feedback in an interpersonal experience.  
1.4. Interpersonal contingency 
Interpersonal contingency is considered to be an important feature in the experience of 
interpersonal encounters. The concept of interpersonal contingency is defined as the 
general responsiveness to another person’s actions during an interaction, including 
mimicry and synchrony. Its presence during an interaction is theorised to influence the 
positive appraisal of others, including trust between individuals (Kendon, 1970) and 
experience of empathy (Van Baaren, Decety, Dijksterhuis, van der Leij, & van Leeuwen, 
2009). A virtual reality study has shown that the presence of mimicry positively influences 
the evaluation of an avatar in participants from a non-clinical population (Bailenson & Yee, 
2007). However, the same positive effects of mimicry have not been observed in socially 
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anxious individuals (Vrijsen et al., 2010), hypothesised to be influenced by self-focused 
attention interrupting the processing of the avatar’s responsiveness. The role of 
interpersonal contingency in persecutory delusions has not yet been investigated. 
However, research has found that clinical populations with persecutory delusions have a 
tendency to perceive intentional contingency between animate shapes with random 
movement (Blakemore, Sarfati, Bazin & Decety, 2003), suggesting a bias in over-attributing 
behavioural contingency.  
1.5. Virtual reality research in paranoia 
In more recent years, virtual reality (VR) has been used as a method to study the 
phenomenon of paranoia (e.g. Freeman et al., 2003, 2008; Freeman et al., 2005; Freeman, 
Pugh, Vorontsova, Antley & Slater, 2010; Fornells-Ambrojo, Barker, Swapp, Slater, Antley & 
Freeman, 2008; Valmaggia et al., 2007). The benefit of using this technology is that it allows 
for a controlled environment in which avatars are consistent and neutral, thus 
interpersonal behaviour and appraisals can be better attributed to the individual’s own 
biases in interpretation rather than the reality of someone’s character. Virtual reality 
studies have shown that participants, including those from clinical populations, 
demonstrate paranoid ideation in relation to avatars (Freeman et al., 2010). The same 
study also showed that factors hypothesised to be related to paranoia, including affective 
processes (anxiety, worry), interpersonal sensitivity and trauma history, were predictive of 
paranoid ideation across the spectrum.  A recently published study has shown that that 
virtual reality can be used therapeutically with individuals with persecutory delusions to 
test threat predictions in paranoia-inducing situations (e.g. public transport) with the 
dropping of safety behaviours (Freeman et al., 2016). However, little research has been 
conducted to investigate how individuals with paranoia experience interpersonal 
interactions and the interpersonal processes associated with paranoid thinking is these VR 
environments. 
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1.6. Paranoia, interpersonal contingency and interpersonal distance 
A recent VR study investigated the influence of contingency on experiences of 
interpersonal trust in individuals with high paranoia in a non-clinical population (Fornells-
Ambrojo et al., 2016). Participants were randomly allocated to high or low contingency 
conditions in a brief, friendly interaction with an avatar programmed either to be highly 
responsive or less responsive (high/low contingency). Higher paranoia was associated with 
larger interpersonal distance kept from the avatar and was independent of actual avatar 
responsiveness. This interpersonal distance was considered to be an avoidant safety 
behaviour employed by those with high paranoia in order to protect against anticipated 
threat, in accordance with safety behaviours being a key maintenance factor of paranoia 
(Freeman et al., 2002). Similar safety behaviours of greater interpersonal distance have also 
been observed in relation to avatars amongst socially anxious individuals (Rinck et al, 
2010).  
  Unexpectedly, Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) found that individuals with high levels 
of paranoia (90th percentile) were the only group to show susceptibility to contingency 
manipulation, experiencing the highly responsive avatar as more trustworthy than the low 
contingency avatar. It was concluded that extreme paranoia may be associated with 
hypersensitivity and preference for contingent behaviour in others which, in turn, could 
explain experiences of mistrust in everyday social situations when others are not highly 
responsive. 
 As yet, no research has been conducted to investigate the interpersonal processes 
relevant to paranoia in a clinical population, principally in those with psychosis. Although 
paranoia is hypothesised to exist on a continuum, a number of cognitive deficits have been 
found to exist in clinical populations of psychosis compared to non-clinical populations e.g. 
attentional deficits (Fioravanti et al., 2005; Neuchterlein et al., 1991) and deficits in theory 
of mind (Brüne, 2005; Sprong et al., 2007).  It is therefore important to investigate whether 
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the hypersensitivity to interpersonal contingency observed in Fornells-Ambrojo et al. 
(2016) is also found in a psychosis population with clinical paranoia.  
 Virtual reality research in clinical populations predominantly uses paradigms that 
are observational and non-verbal i.e. whilst avatars might be present in the scenarios, the 
participant does not verbally communicate with them (e.g. Freeman et al., 2010; Freeman 
et al., 2016). To date, no virtual reality study of clinical paranoia uses a scenario that 
involves an interpersonal interaction with an avatar. Moreover, most studies using virtual 
reality to investigate paranoia have used either ambiguous or anxiety-eliciting situations 
(e.g. Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2008; Freeman et al., 2010; Freeman et al., 2016; Valmaggia 
et al., 2007), whereas the use of positive interactions would allow parallels to be drawn 
between processes that occur in friendly social encounters in everyday life (e.g. brief chat 
with a peer). Furthermore, considering evidence that individuals with persecutory 
delusions experience paranoia towards their therapist, both within and between sessions 
(Lawlor, Hall & Ellett, 2015), the current study stands to inform clinical interactions in 
therapeutic contexts.   
1.7. Study aims and hypotheses 
1.7.1. Feasibility of interactive VR scenario: 
As this study is the first of its kind to use an interpersonal interaction with an avatar to 
investigate factors relevant to a clinically paranoid population, this study aims to evaluate 
the feasibility of using interactive virtual reality with this population. In particular, 
participants’ levels of distress, sense of presence and feedback about the VR scenario will 
be evaluated.   
1.7.2. Paranoia, contingency and trust:  
The primary aim of this study is to investigate the impact of interpersonal contingency on 
trust (subjective and objective) in a clinical population of individuals with paranoia.  
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 Hypothesis 1: People with persecutory delusions are hypothesised to keep a safe 
distance from the avatar regardless of his behaviour. Severity of paranoia will 
predict objective trust (distance) as shown by Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) but 
not subjective trustworthiness.  
 Hypothesis 2: Whereas trusting behaviour is hypothesised to be unaffected by the 
contingency manipulation, it is predicted that greater subjective trust will be 
experienced by clinically paranoid individuals interacting with the high contingency 
avatar compared to the low contingency avatar, replicating Fornells-Ambrojo et al. 
(2016)  with a sample of non-clinical highly paranoid individuals. 
1.7.3. Self-focussed attention: a moderator of contingency sensitivity?  
 Hypothesis 3: However, it is predicted that self-focused attention will moderate the 
impact of contingent behaviour on subjective trust. Participants with higher levels 
of self-focused attention will not show susceptibility to the contingency 
manipulation (whereas those with low levels of self- focussed attention will do as 
stated in hypothesis 1). This will be due to their internal attentional focus impairing 
their processing of the avatar’s behaviour.  
1.7.4. Self-focussed attention: Additional hypotheses  
 In line with the reviewed literature, we hypothesise that higher self-focussed 
attention will be associated with higher social anxiety. 
 Self-focus and other-focus attention will be negatively associated. Clark & Wells 
(1995) propose that self-focused attention prevents the processing of external 
social information therefore one would expect lower levels of other-focused 
attention in those with high levels of self-focused attention.  
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2. Method  
2.1. Design 
The study was jointly conducted with another trainee clinical psychologist (HR) (see 
Appendix 3). A mixed-method, quantitative and qualitative design was employed to 
investigate all hypotheses. A group-comparison design with randomised assignment to two 
conditions, high versus low contingency, was used. The independent variables of paranoia, 
social anxiety and self-focused attention were treated as continuous. The dependent 
variables of trust, measured both subjectively (self-rated) and objectively (behaviourally) 
were also treated as continuous.  
Feasibility of the methodology and participants’ views of the scenario were 
assessed using qualitative data collected using a semi-structured interview and quantitative 
measures of participants’ attention and sense of presence during the VR scenario.  
2.1.1. Participants 
Male participants1 aged 18 and above were recruited from four Early Intervention in 
Psychosis services across three London NHS trusts. Inclusion criteria were a diagnosis of 
psychosis, schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and currently experiencing paranoia. 
Exclusion criteria were a history of epilepsy (due to associated potentially adverse effects 
of virtual reality) or a current clinical presentation (e.g. thought disorder, acutely psychotic 
state) that prevented them from being able to engage in the VR exercise and complete 
primary measures. Individuals under section were also excluded.  
2.1.2. Sample size and power analysis 
The sample needed to evaluate the feasibility of virtual reality as a methodology for 
researching paranoia and interpersonal sensitivity was deemed to be ten or more 
                                                          
1 An all-male sample was chosen in an attempt to minimise the impact of gender differences shown 
to exist in sense of presence in virtual reality (Felnhofer et al. 2012), and taking into account the VR 
interaction was with a male avatar. 
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participants. This sample size would also permit exploratory data analysis of emerging 
trends in the quantitative data along with a thematic analysis of the qualitative interview.  
 Power analyses were conducted using G*Power3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 
2007). Using the data from Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016), a sample size of 26 per group 
(high/low contingency) was calculated based on a large effect size (d = 0.8, α = 0.05, β = 
0.80) to detect an effect of contingency condition on trust. No studies currently investigate 
the effect of self-focused attention on trust or paranoia using the same methodology. As a 
result, the sample size needed to detect a moderating effect of self-focussed attention was 
unknown. It was felt that a sample size of 60 participants (30 per condition) would be 
sufficient. The achieved sample fell considerably short of this. A total of 18 participants 
completed the study and nine participants were randomly allocated to each condition. The 
power of the current study for the detection of contingency sensitivity is 35.8% (β = 0.358). 
2.1.3. Ethics 
The study was giving favourable ethical opinion from Camberwell St Giles NRES Committee 
(see Appendix 4) and R&D approval from all NHS trusts. 
 Prior to taking part, participants were fully informed about the study’s procedure 
and their right to withdraw from participation. They were told that the rationale for 
undertaking the research was to help develop therapeutic tools for mental health service 
users. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants prior to taking part in 
the study.  
  Due to the nature of the participants’ clinical presentation, the researchers 
expected high levels of anxiety in some prospective participants around travelling to and 
from the research location. Researchers accompanied participants to and from the location 
where necessary. Further considerations were made to minimise the likelihood of 
worsening paranoia or distress during the experiment. Recent VR research has found that 
patients with paranoia can feel engaged in VR scenes and experience persecutory thought 
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without experiencing raised levels of distress, anxiety or simulator sickness (Fornells-
Ambrojo et al., 2008). The VR paradigm was designed to be a pleasant experience that is 
non-intrusive and non-threatening.  Participants were informed prior to taking part that 
they could discontinue at any time. All participants were debriefed following completing 
the experiment, including monitoring current distress or adverse experiences.  
2.2. Procedure 
2.2.1. Participant recruitment 
 Participants were referred by their Early Intervention in Psychosis teams following 
presentations to the teams and further correspondence. Initial screening was conducted 
during discussion with care co-ordinators at the point of referral. All potential participants 
were approached by their care co-ordinators with the participant information sheet (see 
Appendix 5). Care co-ordinators sought permission from interested service-users for the 
researchers to contact them to arrange a further screening and verbal consent, either over 
the phone or in person.  
Participants were screened using the Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GTPS; 
Green et al., 2008) as a measure of current paranoia (see appendix 6). A cut-off score of 33 
and above on part A (ideas of social reference) or part B (ideas of persecution) was used to 
meet the paranoia inclusion criterion. As no current measure of paranoia has a validated 
clinical cut-off score, the use of this screening criteria was based upon a current clinical trial 
using this cut-off score on the GTPS to recruit a population with psychosis and paranoia 
(Hardy, 2016). 
Successfully screened participants were then invited to take part in the one-off 
virtual reality experiment. To minimise the risk that an individual’s level of paranoia would 
fluctuate below the threshold for participation in the study, the maximum time between 
screening and testing was one week. There was one exception to this, however the 
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participant was re-screened immediately before participating in the study to confirm they 
still met inclusion criteria.  
 In total, sixty-eight potential participants were referred by the EIS teams. Of these 
referrals, forty-one were successfully approached by their care coordinators about the 
study. Thirty service-users agreed to be contacted by the researchers. Of those contacted 
by the researchers, the following reasons were given (largely before screening) for non-
participation: lack of interest in the study or a feeling that the study did not apply to them 
(n = 5); inability to travel to the testing location (n = 3); lack of availability during the 
opening hours of the testing facility (n = 2); inability to make contact following successful 
screening and recruitment (n = 1). One participant expressed interest but fell below the 
cut-off score for paranoia. Eighteen participants were recruited and completed the study.  
2.2.2. Overview of experimental procedure 
All participants were either escorted to or met at the Virtual Reality Lab with the 
researchers. Written consent was obtained at the start (see Appendix 6). Participants were 
informed that the study was investigating how people interact with virtual environments 
and the impressions people have of the virtual reality avatar. It was explained to 
participants that they would complete a series of questionnaires about themselves before 
taking part in the virtual reality exercise. Participants then entered the virtual reality 
environment and completed the exercise. Following this, participants completed a series of 
measures and a semi-structured interview about their experience in the virtual reality 
exercise. After a final debrief, participants were paid £12.50 and reimbursed for any travel 
expenses. The experiment took approximately 90 minutes. See Table 1 for overview of 
procedure including measures used by both researchers. 
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Table 1: Overview of experiment procedure 
Pre-VR VR exercise Post-VR 
Randomisation to high or low 
contingency condition 
 
Written Consent 
 
Demographic details (age, ethnicity, 
occupation, previous experience of flat 
sharing) 
 
GPTS* 
 
PSYRATS-D* 
 
SIAS* 
 
UCLA Loneliness Scale 
 
 
RG-UK 
 
RQ 
 
FESFS 
 
CAPE-42 
 
PS 
 
Baseline PANAS questionnaire* 
Instructions to VR exercise 
 
Brief rehearsal of questions to ask 
the avatar 
 
Participant interviews virtual 
flatmate (four questions) 
 
Avatar moves towards the window 
and invites participant to follow him 
 
Distance between avatar and 
participant recorded* 
Completion of following 
measures: 
 
Post-VR PANAS* 
 
FAQ* 
 
1-item trustworthy scale*   
 
TICR 
 
Detection of contingency 
check* 
 
Attention check* 
 
Sense of Presence 
Questionnaire* 
 
Semi-structured interview 
about avatar and the VR 
experience and debrief* 
 
Note: * = measures used by the author; CAPE = Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences-42 (Konings, Bak, Hanssen, Van Os, 
& Krabbendam, 2006); FAQ = Focus of Attention Questionnaire (Woody, 1996); TICR = Trust in Close Relationships Scale (Rempel, 
Holmes & Zanna, 1985); FESFS = First Episode Social Functioning Scale (Lecomte et al., 2014); GPTS = Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts 
Scale (Green, Freeman, Kuipers, Bebbington, Fowler, Dunn & Garety, 2008); PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988); PSYRATS-D  = Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scale - Delusions (Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier & 
Faragher, 1999); PS = Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992); RG-UK = Resource Generator UK (Webber & Huxley, 2007); RQ 
= Relationship Questionnaire (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991); SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke, 1998); 
Sense of Presence Questionnaire (Slater, Steed, McCarthy & Maringelli, 1998); SOS = Significant Others Scale (Power, Champion, & 
Aris, 1988);; UCLA Loneliness Scale (Russell, 1996). 
 
2.2.3. Virtual reality exercise 
Before entering the virtual reality environment, participants were informed that they 
would be entering a virtual flat that was available to rent, in which they would meet a 
virtual flatmate called Mark. Participants were given a set of four printed questions with 
which to interview Mark to find out more about the flat. Participants were instructed to ask 
the avatar the scripted questions in order (e.g. ‘What makes a good flatmate?’) and that 
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they should ask the first question when the avatar told them he was ‘ready’. Participants 
were given time to read the questions and remember them as best as they could and were 
also provided with a prompt sheet to take into the virtual reality environment (see 
Appendix 8). To increase the spontaneity of the interaction, participants were told that the 
avatar would introduce himself and may ask their name. Participants were told that they 
could move around the virtual flat as much as they wanted during the exercise but that the 
main aim was to find out how the virtual character comes across and ask to try to pay as 
much attention as possible to what Mark told them. They were further informed that the 
avatar would indicate to them when the interview was over.  
On entering the virtual reality environment, participants were instructed about the 
stereo glasses and allowed to look around the virtual flat to acclimatise to the 
environment. When participants were ready and confirmed they could see in 3D they were 
instructed to stand on a designated spot so that all participants began the exercise in-line 
with the avatar and at approximately the same distance (200cm). Participants were 
instructed they should move as naturally as possible once the scenario started, as they 
would in a normal interaction. The researchers then drew a curtain, informing participants 
they would stay on the other side for the duration of the exercise, and on a final signal 
from participants that they were ready, the scenario was started. The scenario lasted 
approximately two and a half minutes. On exiting the virtual reality scenario, researchers 
verbally checked whether the participant was experiencing any ill-effects.  
2.2.3.1. Virtual reality apparatus 
The visuals of the VR exercise were displayed in an immersive projection system. High-
resolution images were projected in real-time onto three back-projected wall screens (3m x 
2.2m) and a floor screen (3m x 3m). A stereo presentation of the virtual world was 
delivered using Lightweight CrystalEyes shutter-glasses worn by participants. These glasses 
present separate images to the left and right eyes, producing the illusions of 3D objects 
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within and beyond the walls of the laboratory. An inertial/ultrasonic head-tracking device 
was mounted on the glasses, which enabled images to be presented in reference to the 
participants’ physical orientation and viewpoint. This technology provides almost natural 
sensorimotor contingencies for visual perception i.e. as participants move around, the 
environment projected perspective-correct information. Spatialised audio was delivered 
through four corner speakers.  
The majority of the avatar’s verbal and non-verbal responses were controlled via 
button presses on a wireless hand-held device. One button cued the avatar’s nodding 
response when the participant spoke or nodded themselves while a second button was 
used to cue the avatar’s next answer to the participants’ questions. The researchers used 
the device whilst observing each trial to allow for speed and ease of response cuing. 
2.2.3.2. The virtual reality scenario 
The virtual reality scenario was designed specifically for Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) and 
future follow-up studies, programmed by collaborators at the Department of Computer 
Science at UCL and the University of Barcelona. It was designed to be a neutral, non-
threatening or anxiety-provoking and naturalistic (see Figure 1 for images of the scenario in 
sequence). The scenario represented a modern student flat which featured a seating area 
to the left and was decorated to resemble a tidy living room. To the right, there was a 
French window which looked out onto a large sunny window with a barbecue.   
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Figure 1: Images of the virtual reality scenario in sequence 
 
2.2.3.3. The avatar  
The virtual flatmate, ‘Mark’, was present in the virtual flat from the beginning of the 
scenario. He was stood in the centre of the virtual flat which was projected onto the back 
wall of the virtual reality environment. Mark was designed to be a young, casually dressed 
White male in his early twenties. His voice and movement were pre-recorded by a male 
actor and mapped onto the avatar.  A head tracker fitted to the virtual reality glasses worn 
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by participants allowed programming of the avatar’s gaze to always be in the direction of 
the participant. The avatar was also programmed to blink regularly to make his appearance 
more realistic. Throughout the scenario, Mark was programmed to make gestures with his 
arms during conversation and display subtle baseline ambient body movements when 
‘listening’. 
2.2.3.4. Contingency manipulation 
The avatar’s body movements were programmed to either be at either a low or high level 
of contingency with the participant. See Table 2 for an overview of the contingency 
mapping between participant and avatar responses in low and high contingency conditions.   
 In the high contingency condition, the avatar subtly tilted his head when the 
participant tilted their head to either side, in the same direction, with a 1.5 second delay. 
When a participant moved their head in any other way, Mark was programmed to subtly 
move his body either from side to side (swaying) or back and forth. The virtual flatmate 
also nodded to the participant after the participant introduced himself to the avatar as well 
as after every time the participant spoke to the avatar. The slight delay and mixture of 
responses from the avatar were chosen to reduce the likelihood that the participant would 
experience Mark as directly mimicking their actions. This was based on previous research 
that indicated that detection of mimicry may adversely affect individuals’ liking towards 
another (Bailenson, Yee, Patel & Beall, 2008).  
In the low contingency condition, the avatar was programmed to give the same 
responses (head tilts, body movements and nodding), but instead with a 20 second time 
delay. Delayed contingent responses were used in the low contingency condition to control 
for the effects of overall amount of avatar movement on the dependent variables of trust, 
as has been done using different methodology in studies investigating mimicry (e.g. Vrijsen 
et al., 2010). The delay time of 20 seconds was chosen in order for sufficient time to have 
elapsed between participant movement and avatar response so that the participant would 
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not perceive the virtual flatmate’s movements as directly related to their own behaviours. 
Pilot trials run by Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) ensured these two conditions were 
sufficiently different from one another, but subtle enough for manipulations to go 
undetected by participants. Due to the programming of the virtual flatmate, only head tilts 
were executed by the programme throughout the scenario. It was not possible for avatar 
nodding or avatar body movements to be triggered whilst another avatar response was 
‘queued’ to be executed or when the avatar was speaking.  
Table 2: Contingency mapping participant behaviour and avatar responses 
Participant behaviour Avatar responses 
Participant moves head side to side (tilt) 
 
 
 
Participant moves head in any other 
direction (back/front, up/down) 
 
Participant speaks 
Avatar tilts head in the same direction 
and returns head to original centre after 
participant has done so 
 
Avatar moves his body (random choice of 
back to front or side to side (sway) 
 
Avatar nods 
 
2.2.3.5. Virtual scenario script 
The script consisted of 4 main parts: 
 Greetings 
 Participant asks and avatar responds to questions about flat sharing 
 Avatar moves to the terrace and invites participant to look 
 Avatar received unexpected phone call and ends the meeting 
At the start of the scenario, Mark introduced himself to the participant and asks the 
participant their name. After a pause for the participant to respond, Mark then stated that 
he was ‘ready’. This was the cue for participants to ask the virtual flatmate the scripted 
questions about his flat. Participants were unaware that the avatar was unable to respond 
to any unexpected questions.  
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 When participants asked the last question, the avatar invited the participant to 
come to have a look at the terrace, gesturing with his arms as he spoke. See Table 3 for an 
extract of the conversation between participant and avatar. For the full script of the 
conversation, see Appendix 9. Shortly after being invited to and shown the terrace by 
Mark, Mark’s mobile phone rang and Mark took the call. He turned slightly away from the 
participant and spoke briefly and discreetly on his phone. Mark then made his apologies to 
the participant and explained that he had to go. Mark asked the participant if they could 
continue the interview at another time and, after pausing for the participant’s response, 
the scenario faded out to signify the end of the virtual reality exercise.  
Table 3: Extract from the conversation between participant and avatar 
Participant question Avatar verbal response 
[Asks third question] 
 
Who makes a good flatmate? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Asks fourth and final question] 
 
And what would you say is the best 
thing about this flat? 
 
 
Mhm... Good question... don’t know... I’m 
trying to think.... Someone who is easy-going, 
friendly and fun but who also can give you 
space. It is also good to have something in 
common with them, like love for sport, or 
music. It’s hard to answer because I think it 
really depends on the person... I’ve got on 
with 
people who were completely different from 
me… sometimes it just works. 
 
 
The terrace, and the view! Come and have a 
look! 
 
[Avatar moves to window and gazes outside 
before turning back to face participant]. 
 
It’s amazing to have all this outside space, in 
the summer we practically live outside! We 
have great barbecues. 
  
87 
 
2.2.4. Measures 
2.2.4.1. Pre-VR measures 
Before entering the virtual reality environment, participants were asked to complete a 
number of baseline measures. These measures were as follows: 
 
Paranoia: The Green et al. Paranoia Thoughts Scale (GPTS; Green et al., 2008) was used 
both as a screening tool and an experimental measure of paranoia. The GPTS consists of 
two scales of 16-items: Part A assesses endorsement of ideas of social reference (e.g. 
People have definitely laughed at me behind my back) and Part B assesses ideas of 
persecution (e.g. I was convinced there was a conspiracy against me). Items are rated from 
1 = not at all, 3 = somewhat, 5 = extremely, to the extent to which participants have 
experiences these feelings over the past month. Scores on each subscale can range from 16 
to 80, with higher scores indicating a greater degree of paranoid thinking. The internal 
consistency of the GPTS is good, with a Cronbach’s α = .90 in the original clinical sample, 
and the test is considered valid and sensitive to change (Green et al., 2008).  
 
Severity of persecutory delusion: The Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scale – Delusions 
(PSYRATS-D; Haddock et al., 1999) was used as a measure of persecutory delusions severity 
(see Appendix 10). Delusions are assessed by 6 items measuring preoccupation, duration, 
conviction, distress, intensity of distress and disruption. The items are clinician-rated in a 
structured interview. The total score ranges from 0 to 24, with higher scores indicating a 
greater delusional experience. The scale has good internal consistency (α = .90) (Haddock 
et al., 1999) and has been shown to have validity when used in first-episode psychosis 
(Drake et al., 2007).  
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Social anxiety: Trait levels of social anxiety were measured using the Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) (see Appendix 11). The SIAS is a 20-item self-
report scale assessing anxiety in interpersonal encounters (e.g. I feel I’ll say something 
embarrassing when talking). Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale of how characteristic 
each item is for the person (from 0 = ‘Not at all’ to 4 = ‘Extremely’). The total score ranges 
from 0 to 60, with a higher score indicating greater experiences of social anxiety.  It is 
widely used in social phobia literature and has received extensive validation (Peters, 2000). 
The SIAS uses a cut-off score of 34 to indicate the presence of social anxiety. It has been 
shown to discriminate between social anxiety and other anxiety disorders and community 
samples, with a sensitivity of 0.93 and a specificity of 0.66 (Peters, 2000). The measure also 
has good internal consistency (α = .94) (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
 
State affect: To measure change in positive and negative affect during the virtual reality 
exercise, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 
1988) was completed by participants immediately prior to entering the VR environment 
and immediate after completing the exercise. The PANAS is a 20-item self-report 
questionnaire that assesses positive and negative affect on two independent subscales. 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which each word applies to how they feel 
‘right at this present moment’ (e.g. ‘scared’, ‘enthusiastic’) on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 
= ‘Very slightly or not at all’ to 5 = ‘Extremely’). The PANAS has good reliability and validity 
(Crawford & Henry, 2004).  
 
2.2.4.2. Virtual reality measure  
Distance kept from avatar: The distance participants kept from the avatar was 
automatically recorded (in metres) throughout the participants’ time in the virtual 
environment. For each animation frame, the 3D positions of both the avatar’s head and the 
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participant’s head were recorded. The distance was calculated using the horizontal 
Pythagorean distance so that difference in height between participant and avatar were 
ignored. Minimum or shortest distance kept by the participant from the avatar during the 
scene when they are invited by Mark to view the terrace was used as an objective 
behavioural measure of trust. Minimum distance rather than average distance was chosen 
as this is a traditional measure used by proximity (interpersonal space) researchers 
(Hayduk, 1983) and is commonly used in virtual reality proxemics research in this way (e.g. 
Bailenson et al., 2001; Bailenson et al., 2003; Burgoon, Buller, Dillman & Walther, 1995). 
2.2.4.3. Post-VR measures 
Subjective Trust: As used by Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016), participants’ feelings of trust 
towards the avatar were assessed with a Likert-scale item. Participants were asked to rate 
how trustworthy they felt Mark the avatar seemed (‘How trustworthy did Mark come 
across?’) on a 7-point scale (from 1 = ‘Not at al’ to 7 = ‘Very much’) (see Appendix 12).  
Focus of Attention: In order to measure the extent of participants’ self-focused attention 
and other-focused attention, the Focus of Attention Questionnaire (FAQ; Woody, 1996) was 
used (see Appendix 13). The FAQ has two 5-item subscales: self-focused attention (FAQself) 
e.g. ‘I was focusing on what I would say or do next’ and other-focused attention (FAQother) 
e.g. ‘I was focusing on the other person’s appearance or dress’. Each item is rated on a 5-
point scale (from 1 = ‘Not at all’ to 5 = ‘Very much’).  For each subscale, the average item 
score is taken as a measure of self- and other-focused attention, with a higher mean score 
indicating a greater level of attentional focus. Research suggests that the two scales are 
independent and they display distinct patterns of correlations (Woody, Chambless & Glass, 
1997). High internal consistency has been reported for the scale (Woody et al., 1997).  
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Scenario feedback and checks: In order to ascertain whether participants had consciously 
perceived the contingency of the avatar’s body movements (head tilts and nods), 
participants were asked whether they had noticed any relationship between what they did 
and what Mark the avatar did (detection of avatar contingency) (see Appendix 14). 
Participants who responded ‘yes’ to this question were asked to give details of what they 
noticed. To assess whether participants were directing sufficient attention to the virtual 
flatmate during the scenario, participants were asked two ‘true or false’ questions about 
what the virtual flatmate had told them during their conversation about flat-sharing (e.g. 
‘One reason that Mark the virtual flatmate gave for why he likes flat sharing is that he has 
made new friends’).  
Sense of presence: The Sense of Presence Questionnaire (Slater, Steed, McCarthy & 
Maringelli, 1998, Appendix 15) assessed the extent to which participants felt present in the 
virtual world, as opposed to their physical location (e.g. ‘During the experience, which was 
strongest on the whole, your sense of being in the virtual flat, or being in the real world of 
the laboratory’). Participants rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale with a higher score 
indicating a greater sense of presence in the virtual flat.   
 
Qualitative feedback: In order to elicit richer information about participant’s experience in 
the virtual reality environment, a brief, semi-structured qualitative interview was 
administered at the end of the experiment. The interview invited participants to share their 
thoughts about the virtual flatmate and the virtual environment in general. The interview 
was conducted by one of the researchers while the other researcher wrote down the 
participant’s answers verbatim. See Appendix 16 for the full interview structure.  
2.3. Planned Data Analysis 
All quantitative data analyses were conducted using SPSS (Version 21). 
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2.3.1. Feasibility of interactive VR scenario 
Affect change: To assess the impact of the virtual reality scenario on participants’ affect 
states, differences between baseline and post-VR positive and negative affect scores as 
measured by the PANAS were assessed. To assess if the virtual reality experience was a 
predominantly positive experience, differences in mean positive and negative affect scores 
were compared pre-VR and post-VR with related-sample t-tests. The post-VR comparison 
used a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test as assumptions of normality could not be 
assumed for the post-VR negative PANAS variable. To assess whether there was a 
significant change in positive or negative affect during the virtual reality scenario, related-
sample t-tests compared pre- and post-VR PANAS scores for positive affect (parametric 
test) and negative affect (non-parametric test). 
Detection of contingency manipulation: A non-parametric equivalent of chi-squared 
(Fisher’s exact test) was used to identify whether group differences in perception of 
contingency were observed. 
Participant feedback: Participants’ responses about their overall experience in the virtual 
reality exercise were analysed to evaluate the feasibility of the methodology in a clinically 
paranoid population. Responses were predominantly from the final question ‘What did you 
think of the VR environment?  Do you have any feedback on the VR experience?’ but all 
responses were assessed.  
A generic thematic analysis approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006; 2016) was used to 
analyse responses. Four distinct categories arose as a coding framework from 
familiarisation with the data relevant to the broader concept of interactive virtual reality 
feasibility: safety, enjoyment, immersion in the environment and engagement in the avatar 
interaction. Themes were then searched for by the researcher within the coding framework 
and reviewed in the context of the full data set. The qualitative ‘essence’ of each theme 
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was reported with data extracts. Participant responses were then triangulated with 
relevant quantitative measures to assess whether verbal responses were concordant with 
responses given on self-report measures.  
2.3.2. Paranoia, contingency and trust 
Associations between the two measures of severity of paranoid ideation and objective trust 
(distance) were to be analysed using non-parametric correlation analysis (Spearman’s rho).  
The originally planned data analysis for subjective trust analyses was based on the 
study reaching sufficient power (β = .80) based on a sample size of n = 26 in each 
contingency group. In this instance, participants’ sensitivity to contingency manipulation 
was to be analysed (if normality assumptions were met) with two independent t-tests 
assessing the difference in trust measures (subjective and objective) between high and low 
contingency groups. Regression analysis was planned to analyse the moderating effects of 
self-focused attention on subjective trust towards the avatar and susceptibility to 
contingency. However, the study did not obtain a sample size large enough to adequately 
evaluate the effects of interpersonal contingency and self-focus attention on trust toward 
the avatar with statistics alone (β = .067; n = 9 per condition).  
Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA; Tukey, 1977) was also used to systematically 
explore the data and assess hypotheses.  This method of analysis emphasises displaying the 
data graphically and its use in research in clinical psychology is well supported (Barker, 
Pistrang & Elliott, 2016). The distribution and normality of all variables were explored using 
univariate non-graphical EDA (e.g. inspection of mean, range and skewedness) and 
univariate graphical EDA (e.g. histograms and box and whisker plots). Comparisons of trust 
between contingency conditions were explored using side-by-side boxplots.  
Correlates of trust measures were also explored using Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient where assumptions of normality could be assumed and non-parametric 
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equivalent correlational analyses where assumptions of normality were not met by 
variables.  
2.3.3. Self-focused attention: moderation of contingency sensitivity and additional analysis 
The moderator of focus of attention was investigated using graphical EDA, namely 
multivariate scatterplots with R2 values calculated (i.e. the proportion of the variation in one 
variable explained by another variable) to assess the strength of the relationship. 
Correlation analyses were used to assess whether self-focused attention was 
associated with either social anxiety or other-focused attention. Non-parametric equivalent 
correlational analyses (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient) were used where 
assumptions of normality were not met by variables.  
2.4. Data screening 
2.4.1. Missing data 
All primary measures were completed fully by participants with the exception of one 
participant who did not complete the PSYRATS-D due to his emerging distress during the 
completion of the GPTS relevant to discussing his paranoid experiences. One participant 
gave a double response on the PANAS. To correct for the double scored items, the more 
conservative of the double score was chosen. One participant did not complete the 
qualitative interview due to time constraints and participant fatigue.  
2.4.2. Normality of distributions 
All data was screened for normality and outliers. Inspection of histograms, distributions of 
variances, significance levels on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and values of skewedness 
and kurtosis indicated that most measures were found to be normally distributed.  No clear 
outliers were detected in any measure.  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of normality were found to be significant for the FAQself 
(p = .001), measure of objective trust (p = .036) and the post-VR negative affect PANAS (p = 
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.019). Inspection of skewedness and kurtosis did not reveal any obvious abnormalities in 
the spread of distributions. Non-parametric analyses were used for these measures to 
minimise the likelihood of type I errors.  
3. Results 
3.1. Descriptives 
3.1.1. Demographics 
Please see Table 4.  Eighteen male participants completed the virtual reality paradigm. Nine 
participants were randomly allocated to the high contingency condition and nine to the low 
contingency condition. The sample had a mean age of 26.3 (SD = 5.57).  Participants self-
described as a variety of ethnicities, most frequently as White British (44.4%). 
Mental health diagnoses consisted of F20-F29 diagnoses of schizophrenia, 
schizotypal and delusional disorders.  The sample comprised mostly of individuals who 
were in some form of employment or education (76.5%).   
Table 4: Key demographics of sample 
Demographic Summary Statistic 
Age, mean (SD) 26.3 (5.57) 
  
Ethnicity, n (%)  
White British 8 (44.4%) 
Other 10 (55.6%) 
  
Employment, n (%)  
In education 6 (35.3%) 
Employed 7 (41.2%) 
Unemployed 4 (23.5%) 
 
 
3.1.2. Symptom measures 
3.1.2.1. Paranoia 
The present sample had an average PSYRATS-D score (severity of persecutory delusion) of 
13.1 (SD = 4.33), which is comparable but slightly lower than other VR studies using clinical 
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populations with paranoia e.g. Freeman et al. (2016) mean score of 17.3 (SD = 2.70). The 
sample’s mean overall score for paranoid thinking (using the GTPS) was 94.9 (SD = 28.9). 
Mean scores for ideas of social reference (part A) and ideas of persecution (part B) were 
similar: 45.8 (SD = 13.97) and 49.2 (SD = 16.62) respectively. No current VR paranoia study 
uses the GPTS as a measure of comparison however these scores are comparable to other 
large-scale studies using clinical populations with persecutory delusions e.g. van 
Oosterhout et al. (2014) (N = 150) had a mean overall score of 96.8 (SD = 22.98), mean part 
A score of 49.2 (SD = 11.0) and a mean part B score of 47.7 (SD = 14.05). In the current 
study, PSYRATS-D scores were closely associated with overall GPTS scores (see Table 5).  
3.1.2.2. Social anxiety 
The present sample had a relatively large proportion of individuals scoring above the 
clinical cut-off score on the SIAS. Fifty percent of participants scored 34 or above on the 
SIAS, compared to 36% of individuals with psychosis having a co-morbid diagnosis of social 
anxiety in the community (Pallanti, Quercioli and Hollander, 2004). The average SIAS score 
for this sample was 33.4 (SD = 14.09) which is comparable to clinical populations with social 
phobia e.g. Mattick & Clarke (1998) mean score of 34.6 (SD = 16.4). This average is lower 
than mean scores observed in psychosis populations co-morbid with social anxiety e.g. 
Birchwood et al. (2007) mean score of 51.9 (SD = 11.9).   
3.1.3. Self-focused attention 
In the present sample, six participants reported high levels of self-focused attention (i.e. 
with an average FAQself score ≥ 3) during the virtual reality exercise. This suggests that the 
majority of participants (66.7%) had moderate to low levels of self-focused attention.  
96 
 
Table 5 shows the non-parametric correlations between focus of attention 
measures and symptom measures. Against the hypothesis, informed by Clark & Wells 
(1995) model, self- and other-focus of attention were positively correlated (rs = .702, p = 
.001) (see Figure 2). Also against the predictions by Clark & Wells’ (1995) model, self-focus 
of attention and social anxiety (SIAS) were not significantly correlated (rs = .433, p = .073).  
Figure 2: Relationship between self- and other-focus of attention 
Outside of predicted observations, other-focus of attention was positively 
correlated with PSYRATS-D scores (r = .526, p = .03), suggesting that greater external focus 
of attention was associated with greater severity of persecutory delusion. However, neither 
self-focused attention nor other-focused attention were associated with ideas of social 
reference (GPTS A), ideas of persecution (GPTS B) or overall paranoid ideas (GPTS Total). 
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Table 5: Correlations between focus of attention variables and symptom measures 
Measures 
Correlation coefficient 
 
1. 
rs 
p 
2. 
r 
p 
3. 
r 
p 
4. 
r 
p 
5. 
r 
p 
6. 
r 
p 
1. FAQself 
 
- 
     
2. FAQother  .702** 
.001 
- 
    
3. SIAS 
 
0.433 
.073 
0.615 
.628 
- 
   
4. PSYRATS-D 0.283 
.272 
.526* 
.03 
0.184 
.479 
- 
  
5. GPTS Total 
 
0.175 
.487 
0.177 
.482 
0.289 
.245 
0.48 
.051 
- 
 
6. GPTS Social reference 
 
0.1 
.694 
0.127 
.615 
0.358 
.145 
0.467 
.059 
.910** 
>.0001 
- 
7. GPTS Persecution 0.023 
.926 
0.194 
.440 
0.188 
.455 
0.434 
.082 
.938** 
>.0001 
.710** 
.0009 
*p < .01; **p < .001 
Note: As the assumption of normal distribution of FAQself was not met, Spearman's rank correlation coefficents (rs) are 
reported. As assumptions of normality were met for all other measure, Pearsons correlation coefficients (r) are reported.  
 
3.2. Feasibility of the virtual reality scenario 
3.2.1. Sense of presence, attention and contingency perception checks 
Participants’ mean score of their sense of presence in the virtual scenario (24.9, SD = 9.77, 
range 8-39) was similar to that of the non-clinical group mean (25.47) found by Fornells-
Ambrojo et al. (2016). 
Post-VR attention checks indicated that the majority of participants (66.7%) had 
paid good attention to the virtual avatar and the conversation. Five participants (33.3%) 
had answered one or both questions incorrectly. Compared to Fornells-Ambrojo et al. 
(2016), in which only 9.8% of the sample of healthy participants answered one or both 
questions incorrectly, the current sample showed lower levels of attention. 
In the highly contingent condition, post-VR responses to the contingency 
perception check indicated that seven of the nine participants (77.8%) said there was a 
relationship between what they did and what the avatar did. In comparison, three of the 
nine participants (33.3%) in the low contingency condition reported a relationship between 
their actions and that of the avatar, albeit this difference was non-significant (Fisher’s Exact 
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test Chi2 = 3.60, p = .153). Further inspection of verbatim responses suggests that three 
participants clearly confirmed detection of the contingency. Other comments were less 
specific or ambiguous (e.g. “The virtual flatmate came too close to me”; “He was looking at 
me, body language a little bit accurate”, “He responded to the scripted questions and 
seemed to follow my gaze”), indicating possible but not definite detection of the 
contingency. Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) (n = 63) similarly found a greater number of 
participants in the high contingency condition detecting a possible contingency relationship 
compared to those in the low contingency condition (33.3% vs. 4.9%; Fisher’s Exact test 
Chi2 = 4.50, p = .034).   
3.2.2. Safety 
At the end of the VR scenario all participants were asked if they had or were experiencing 
any adverse effects e.g. nausea, dizziness etc. One participant experienced nausea due to 
flickering glasses but this passed within ten minutes of the virtual reality scenario ending.  
3.2.2.1. Positive and negative affect 
Overall, the amount of positive affect reported by participants both before and after the 
virtual reality environment was significantly greater than the amount of negative affect 
reported pre- and post-VR (t(17) = 6.528, p < .001; Z = -3.664, p < .001) (see Figure 3). Non-
parametric comparison of means found a significant reduction in mean total negative 
emotion scores (Z = -2.612, p = .009). There was no significant change found in positive 
affect scores (Z = -.906, p = .365). 
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Figure 3: Change in total positive and negative affect 
 
Scores from the positive affect items on the PANAS indicate that participants were 
experiencing moderate levels of a range of positive emotions before the VR scenario 
(average total 29.4, SD = 5.14, range = 21.0 – 38.0) and this positive affect largely increased 
or stayed the same after the VR scenario (average total 31.1, SD = 8.74, range 13.0 – 48.0) 
(see Figure 4). Scores from the negative affect items on the PANAS indicate that 
participants were experiencing some negative emotions at relatively low levels before the 
VR scenario (average total 16.6, SD = 5.51, range = 10 – 27) and that these had all 
decreased immediately after completing the VR scenario (average total 12.9, SD = 3.19, 
range = 10 – 20) (see Figure 5). The trends seen in pre-VR and post-VR positive and 
negative affect in this sample are similar to those found in Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016), 
as can be seen in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Comparison of pre-VR and post-VR PANAS scores for current study and the high 
paranoia group in Elenbaas (2013) 
 
Pre-VR 
positive 
affect 
Post-VR 
positive 
affect   
Pre-VR 
negative 
affect 
Post-VR 
negative 
affect   
 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) Z p 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) Z p 
Current study 29.38 
(5.14) 
31.11 
(8.74) 
-0.906 0.365 16.56 
(5.51) 
12.89 
(3.20) 
-2.612 .009 
Fornells-
Ambrojo et al. 
(2016)  
High paranoia 
group 
31.17 
(5.13) 
31.42 
(4.81) 
-0.1 0.947 13.25 11.92 -2.14 0.045 
 
Further inspection of individual items of positive affect show high levels of interest 
before and after the VR scenario and a noticeable increase in excitement (see Figure 4). 
Content analysis of participant responses in the qualitative interview support this finding, 
with a number of participants expressing interest and enjoyment during the scenario (see 
Table 7). Inspection of individual items of negative affect show noticeable reductions in 
participants’ experiences of distress, nervousness and feeling scared (see Figure 5). This is 
also supported by the responses identified in the content analysis (see Table 7), in which 
only a small minority of participants reported experiencing anxiety during the scenario.  
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Figure 4: Average positive affect scores pre- and post-VR scenario 
 
Figure 5: Average negative affect scores pre- and post-VR scenario 
 
3.2.3. Qualitative feedback about VR scenario 
Table 7 gives an overview of the content analysis of the feasibility of the virtual reality 
scenario based on participant responses in the qualitative interview. In the category of 
safety, only two participants reported possible adverse physical effects which were 
relatively minor and only one was clearly related to the virtual reality environment. Four 
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participants reported some level of anxiety during the experiment, one participant 
expressed brief, low-level annoyance and one reported a brief experience of aggression. 
Triangulation of these participants using the post-VR negative affect PANAS revealed that 
only one participant reporting anxiety (ppt 17) gave a high post-VR response for 
nervousness.  All other participants reporting negative affect during the VR indicated no, or 
very little, experience of related emotions on the post-VR PANAS. 
 In the category of enjoyment, eight participants gave clearly positive feedback 
about their overall virtual reality experience, indicating enjoyment. Six participants 
specifically commented that they felt relaxed and comfortable. Post-VR positive affect 
scores support these responses, with these participants scoring relatively highly on overall 
positive affect following the virtual reality environment. However, other participants with 
similarly high post-VR positive affect did not make reference to this in their verbal 
feedback. The seven participants specifying positive affect experienced during the scenario 
gave scores for related emotions on the post-VR PANAS which corroborated their verbal 
feedback e.g. high score on ‘excited’ (ppt 16), ‘strong’ (ppt 18). 
Analysis of participants’ level of immersion in the virtual reality environment found 
ten participants (58.8%) reporting the virtual reality environment immersive or realistic. 
One participant specifically stated that he thought the scenario would be clinically useful 
for people with mental health problems.  The predominant element of the scenario which 
detracted from participants’ immersion in the environment was the graphics, with seven 
participants critiquing the quality of the visuals. Mixed opinions were found about using the 
prompts during the interaction, with three participants finding the prompts useful and 
adding to their sense of comfort in the environment and two participants commenting that 
the prompts detracted from their immersion in the scenario.  
Analysis of participants’ engagement in the interaction with the avatar found that 
11 participants (64.7%) gave responses indicative of good engagement or immersion in the 
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interaction with the avatar. Analysis of responses revealed a predominant theme of 
participants likening the interaction to that of a real interaction with another person. Nine 
participants commented that they experienced their interaction with the avatar as similar 
to a real-life interaction. Only one participant (ppt 11) reported finding the interaction 
artificial. Four participants reported that the avatar’s behaviour during the scenario was 
realistic and aided immersion in the interaction. Three participants directly commented on 
their interest in the avatar, indicative of good engagement in the interaction. Participants’ 
critique of the interaction was largely centred on the content of the verbal interaction. Five 
participants commented that the content of their conversation with the avatar was a 
limiting factor in their immersion in the interaction e.g. being less restricted in the 
questions they could ask the avatar, having a longer introduction period to get to know 
each other better. 
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Table 7: Content analysis of feasibility of virtual reality scenario 
Category Description Themes N (%) Quotes 
Safety An absence of an 
increase in level of anxiety, distress or paranoia 
and no triggering of significant levels 
of simulator sickness. Simulator sickness refers 
to symptoms 
similar to motion sickness (e.g. nausea, 
dizziness) that can 
sometimes be caused by virtual environments 
(Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2008).  
Experience of adverse 
physical effects 
 
 
2 (11.8%) "I had a stomach ache" (ppt 5); "Felt ok in there but now I have tension in my forehead and feel weird, dry mouth. 
It’s getting better though" (ppt 13) 
Anxiety 
 
 
4 (23.5%) "At the beginning I was a bit anxious but when I kept talking my anxiety went away and I was more calm" (ppt 14); 
"[I felt] a bit agitated" (ppt 17) 
Other negative 
emotions 
 
 
2 (11.8%) "When his mobile set off… it annoyed me a bit" (ppt 14) 
"I felt aggressive when he asked me to look at the window" (ppt 1);  
Enjoyment 
 
Experiencing positive emotions as a direct result 
of being in the virtual reality environment e.g. 
excitement, comfort. Positive feedback of the 
scenario which is indicative of enjoyment e.g. 
"cool", "brilliant" etc.  
 
Positive evaluations of 
participants 
experience 
8 (47.1%) "It was cool" (ppt 5); "Amazing" (ppt 8); "It was perfect" (ppt 8); "Really good… really interesting" (ppt 15);  
Positive emotions 
 
7 (41.2%) "[I felt] relaxed and comfortable" (ppt 1); "It’s fun and exciting… that’s what I felt" (ppt 16); "[I felt] better and 
stronger because he was friendly and open, not hostile" (ppt 18)  
Clinical usefulness 
 
 
1 (5.9%) "The technology is impressive, in two years tech will be able to be used for mental health to help people that can't 
get out of the house. They can use it to gradually get out, talk to people.  It could be used therapeutically, would 
be really helpful." (ppt 8) 
Immersion in 
the 
environment 
A subjective experience of being immersed in 
the virtual reality environment so that is it 
experience as 'real' as opposed to a virtual 
reality scenario. This includes experiences of 
being in a real flat, comments of realisticness of 
the virtual reality environment. Also includes 
aspects of the experience which aided or limited 
immersion in the scenario. 
Immersion 
 
 
4 (23.5%) "It felt like I was in a different place" (ppt 5); "I felt immersed and part of the flat" (ppt 12); "[the environment] 
absorbs and attracts you" (ppt 18) 
  
Realistic 
 
 
6 Yes 
(35.3%) 
 
1 No  
(5.9%) 
 
 
"[it was] realistic, it felt like a home" (ppt 9); "It was realistic" (ppt 14) 
 
"It didn’t feel realistic but that was because I was worrying about the paper and questions and not walking into the 
wall" (ppt 13); 
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Table 7 continued 
Category Description Themes  Quotes 
Immersion in 
the 
environment 
A subjective experience of being immersed in 
the virtual reality environment so that is it 
experience as 'real' as opposed to a virtual 
reality scenario. This includes experiences of 
being in a real flat, comments of realisticness of 
the virtual reality environment. Also includes 
aspects of the experience which aided or limited 
immersion in the scenario. 
Graphics 
 
 
4 Good 
(23.5%) 
 
7 Critique 
(41.2%) 
 
"The graphics were good" (ppt 12); "; "The graphics were good... the 3D was good and immersive" (ppt 15) 
 
 
"Better graphics would have made it more realistic" (ppt 1); "The flat itself was not that realistic.  I knew from the 
visuals that I couldn't keep walking" (ppt 7) 
 
Digital interface: high 
quality  
 
2 (11.8%) "Going to the terrace and looking out and the environment moves with you [made it realistic]" (ppt 8); "I like the 
way that, the interface of it, the wall the walls changed as you moved, responding to my movement" (ppt 16) 
  
Lab equipment and 
environment 
awareness 
 
4 (23.5%) "Glasses weighed me down, almost slid off when I looked down, goggles would be better" (ppt 1); "the top corners 
of the environment could be blocked out, but I might have been paying more attention to them because I am tall" 
(ppt 10) 
Immersion in 
the 
environment 
A subjective experience of being immersed in 
the virtual reality environment so that is it 
experience as 'real' as opposed to a virtual 
reality scenario. This includes experiences of 
being in a real flat, comments of realisticness of 
the virtual reality environment. Also includes 
aspects of the experience which aided or limited 
immersion in the scenario. 
Appearance of the 
virtual flat 
 
 
2 Good 
(11.8%) 
 
 
4 Critique 
(23.5%) 
“Felt real, the features in the flat (TV, balcony), when you walk you can see it clearly, see it like looking out the 
window" (ppt 9)  
 
"There could be more detail like adding a carpet... He could have had photos of other flatmates to add detail to 
him as a character" (ppt 12); "the flat wasn’t very detailed.  The ‘skin’ – is that the word – the texture of the 
environment like the sofa was quite plain, and the walls could have had had texture, the textures could have been 
improved" (ppt 15);  
Length of scenario 
 
1 Good 
(5.9%) 
 
4 Critique 
(23.5%) 
" It could have been longer" (ppt 5); "too short, should be longer" (ppt 9);  
 
 
"It was a good length, not too long or short" (ppt 12) 
Prompts 
 
 
3 Good 
(17.6%) 
2 Critique 
(11.8%) 
"Liked having the prompts, knowing that I didn't have to talk too much was helpful" (ppt 1); "It felt safer with the 
question prompts" (ppt 5) 
 
"I would have preferred not to have had the [prompt] sheet but then I would have forgotten the questions!" (ppt 
13); "Asking the questions on the sheet made me remember that I was in VR" (ppt 8) 
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Table 7 continued 
Category Description Themes  Quotes 
Engagement 
in the 
interaction 
Evidence of attention to the verbal interaction 
with the avatar and reports of realisticness or 
immersion in the interaction. Aspects of the 
avatar which aided or limited the engagement 
in the interaction 
Avatar behaviour 
 
 
4 (23.5%) "Mark's behaviour was very on point, even though he didn't look that realistic, that made it more so" (ppt 10); "His 
response was quick, it was a good response time, which added to the level of immersion and feeling real" (ppt 15); 
"The way Mark shows you the terrace, makes it more realistic with his movement" (ppt 18) 
Avatar voice 
 
 
1 (5.9%) "Some bits were realistic, the human voice" (ppt 7) 
Engagement 
in the 
interaction 
Evidence of attention to the verbal interaction 
with the avatar and reports of realisticness or 
immersion in the interaction. Aspects of the 
avatar which aided or limited the engagement 
in the interaction 
Content of verbal 
interaction 
 
 
5 (29.4%) "It would be better to have a list of vague questions, he expanded on some of them, if the prompts were more 
vague he could expand more and it would seem like a conversation with a person" (ppt 7); "If the responses had 
felt more real and less rehearsed. As time went on it was stilted, it felt like he had given pre-planned answers a 
million times over, not fluid" (ppt 11) 
Likeness to a real 
interaction 
 
 
9 Good 
(52.9%) 
 
 
1 Critique 
(5.9%) 
"Like talking to a person… He answered questions in real time, seconds after" (ppt 8); "Interaction was good, 
balcony situation felt like I was walking with a real person" (ppt 14); "It was the same as speaking to someone for 
the first time" (ppt 16);  
 
"He was artificial, he was obviously pre-programmed so it was hard to know what he was going to say before the 
questions" (ppt 11) 
Interest in avatar 
 
 
3 (17.6%) "He kept me interested" (ppt 5); "he was as neutral as he could be but still sparked my interest" (ppt 15) 
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3.3. Virtual reality outcomes 
3.3.1. Subjective and objective trust 
The average minimum distance kept by participants from the avatar during the terrace 
scene (objective trust) was 1.02m (SD = .42), a slightly larger distance than that observed in 
the non-clinical sample (M (SD) = .92 (.23)) by Elenbaas (2013). Participants average avatar 
trustworthiness score was 4.7 (SD = 1.67), similar to the average trustworthy score of 4.9 
(SD = 1.07) found in the non-clinical sample.  
Correlational analysis of the subjective measure of trust and objective trust 
behaviour showed no relationship between these variables (rs = -.184, p = .464). Similarly, 
Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) found no significant relationship between their objective and 
subjective measures of trust (r = -.05, p = .418).  
3.3.1.1. Trusting behaviour and paranoia (Hypothesis 1) 
Keeping a larger distance from the avatar (objective trust) was predicted by higher severity 
of persecutory delusions (PSYRATS-D) (Spearman’s r = 0.52, p = .034) but not by general 
endorsement of paranoid ideas (Spearman’s r = -0.17, p = .490) showing partial support for 
hypothesis 1 (see Table 8). 
Table 8: Correlations and associated p-values between objective and subjective trust and symptom 
measures, affect and focus of attention outcomes 
 
TRUST 
OUTCOME 
VARIABLES  PARANOIA SEVERITY  SOCIAL ANXIETY PROCESSES AFFECT CHANGE  
  PSYRATS 
GPTS 
Total SIAS SFA OFA 
Positive 
affect 
Post-VR 
Positive 
affect 
pre-post 
change 
Negative 
affect 
Post-VR 
Negative 
affect  
pre-post 
change 
Objective Trust       
   
 Spearman’s r .515* -.174 .405 .319 .150 -.207 -.170 .590** -.093 
 p-value .034 .490 .095 .197 .552 .410 .500 .010 .714 
Subjective Trust          
 Pearson's r -.417 -.030 .172 .129 -.023 .428 .539* .0161 .176 
 p-value .096 .905 .495 .609 .927 .076 .021 .949 .486 
*p < .01; **p < .001 
1Spearman’s rank correlation co-efficient (rs) reported as assumptions of normality are not met for this variable 
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3.3.1.2. Other predictors of trust 
Correlational analyses were conducted to investigate if social anxiety processes and affect 
predicted subjective or objective trust (see Table 8). Participants experiencing a higher 
degree of negative affect during the virtual reality scenario kept a greater distance from the 
avatar during the terrace scene, whereas an increase in positive affect during the virtual 
interpersonal exchange was associated with experiencing the avatar as more subjectively 
trustworthy. Neither social anxiety nor focus of attention predicted any of the trust 
outcome variables.  
3.3.2. Avatar contingency and trust (hypotheses 1 & 2) 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that participants in the high contingency condition would rate the 
avatar as significantly more trustworthy than in the low contingency group, as can be seen 
in Table 9 and Figure 6 there is no indication that the contingency manipulation had an 
impact on subjective trust, against the prediction, or objective trust, as predicted.  
Table 9: Trust measure for high and low contingency conditions 
 
High contingency Low contingency 
Mean subjective trust (SD) 4.56 (2.07) 4.89 (1.27) 
Mean objective trust 
(min. distance (m)) (SD) 
1.00 (.36) 1.05 (.49) 
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Figures 6a & 6b: Boxplots of subjective trust and objective trust outcomes between groups 
 
3.3.3. Self-focused attention and trust (hypothesis 3) 
The third experimental hypothesis stated that self-focused attention would moderate the 
impact of contingent behaviour on subjective trust as high levels of attention paid to the 
self would prevent the processing of avatar interpersonal contingency, thus this 
information would not contribute to feelings of trust towards the avatar. Lack of power 
prevents statistical investigation of this hypothesis. Graphical exploratory data analysis 
shows no clear evidence of a moderation of trust by self-focus attention (see Figure 7a). 
Figure 7a suggests that in the low contingency condition, the higher the level of self-
focused attention, the higher the perception of trust. The R2 value of 0.57 in the high 
contingency condition suggests that 57% of the variance in subjective trust is explained by 
self-focused attention. No impact of self-focused attention is apparent in the high 
contingency condition. A similar trend is observed in graphical EDA of other-focused 
attention and subjective trust (see Figure 7b). Figure 7b suggests that in the low 
contingency condition, the higher the level of other-focused attention, the higher the 
perception of trust. However, the R2 value (0.23) suggests that only 23% of the variance in 
subjective trust is attributable to other-focused attention. Again, there is no impact of 
other-focused attention on subjective trust in the high contingency condition.   
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Figure 7a & b: Scatterplots (with trend lines and R2 values) of subjective trust and self-
focused attention and subjective trust and other-focused attention in high and low 
contingency groups 
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Summary of findings 
The present study investigated the safety and feasibility of interpersonally interactive 
virtual reality in a clinical population with psychosis and paranoia. Both quantitative and 
qualitative data suggest that this methodology is not only safe and immersive but also 
enjoyable for individuals with clinical paranoia. Furthermore, findings indicate that 
interactive virtual reality is a potentially useful tool for experimental research in paranoia 
and give provisional implications for future therapeutic use.    
 The objective trust measure of interpersonal distance kept from the avatar was 
associated with severity of persecutory delusions, as predicted, and negative affect 
experienced during the virtual reality scenario. Subjective trust ratings towards the avatar 
did not show a hypersensitivity to contingent behaviour in the avatar, as was predicted 
from the findings in a highly paranoid, non-clinical population (Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 
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2016). Considering the lack of power in the current study, and the lack of correcting for 
multiple comparisons, only tentative conclusions can be drawn from this observation.  
The present study also investigated the potential role of state focus of attention in 
clinical paranoia and its impact on interpersonal experiences. The study’s findings of a 
positive association with self- and other-focus of attention and a lack of influence of self-
focused attention on trust may highlight a complexity in the process of self-focused 
attention and its role in clinical phenomena such as paranoia. 
4.1.1. Interactive VR: a viable tool for people with psychosis who experience paranoia 
Similar to conclusions drawn by Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2008), the current study’s virtual 
reality scenario was shown to be a safe research tool to use with individuals with clinical 
paranoia. Only one participant reported brief effects of simulator sickness and only a small 
minority of participants verbally reported low-level experiences of anxiety during the 
scenario.  
Overall, positive affect was found to be significantly higher than negative affect 
experienced by participants. Furthermore, a significant reduction in post-VR negative affect 
was also found. This supports the proposal that virtual reality does not create discomfort, 
including anxiety, in participants with clinical paranoia (Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2008). In 
fact, the observed increases in positive affect, particularly excitement, and the positive 
feedback given indicates that the large majority of participants enjoyed their virtual reality 
experience.  
 The feasibility of interactive virtual reality as a research tool in clinical paranoia is 
also supported by the study’s findings. Participants experienced a sense of presence in the 
virtual reality world, comparable to clinical populations with paranoia in non-interactive 
virtual reality paradigms (Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2008) and non-clinical participants in the 
same scenario (Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2016). Participants also reported finding the overall 
experience “realistic” and “immersive”. Of particular importance, thematic analysis of 
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interview responses showed good evidence for participant’s engagement and immersion in 
the interaction with the avatar. Numerous participants likened their interaction with the 
avatar to a real-life interpersonal encounter, with some commenting that the avatar’s body 
language and behaviour particularly added to their immersion in the interaction. This gives 
promise for its future use as a tool to investigate potential trait and ‘in situ’ factors 
impacting on interpersonal experiences in paranoia.  
The current clinical sample were shown to pay less attention to the content of the 
conversation with the avatar compared to the non-clinical sample, albeit the majority still 
evidenced good attention. Lower levels of attention is arguably expected from a clinical 
population, considering impaired attention is proposed to be a fundamental cognitive 
deficit in patients with schizophrenia (Fioravanti et al., 2005; Neuchterlein et al., 1991).  
The indication of reduced attention in the current clinical sample is also supported by 
research showing that paranoid delusions are associated with impaired cognitive 
performance i.e. executive functioning, tendency to jump to conclusions and theory of 
mind (ToM) deficits (Bentall et al., 2009). This highlights a possible issue in the future use of 
verbally interactive virtual reality in clinical populations with paranoia, as it requires a 
degree of both attention (executive function) and reasoning about the mental state of 
others (ToM). It also highlights that individuals with clinical paranoia may have reduced 
attention to verbal content during therapeutic interactions and this should be considered 
by clinicians during therapy.   
 Some participants reported that the quality of the graphics of the virtual reality 
scenario detracted from their immersion in the environment, as did wearing the visual 
equipment. Constant development of virtual reality technology, primarily for the gaming 
industry, gives great promise for future developments of virtual reality as a clinical research 
and therapeutic tool. For example, the newly developed Oculus Rift is an inexpensive, 
consumer headset that can be used with a high-end computer, rather than the elaborate 
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and expensive virtual reality laboratories currently used. This technology has been shown 
to enable enhanced visual graphics and a superior immersive experience in virtual 
environments (Desai et al., 2014). In future, this could provide a more immersive 
experience in interactive virtual reality and improve the validity of interpersonal responses 
elicited by avatars in virtual reality scenarios.   
4.1.2. No evidence of hypersensitivity to contingency in a clinically paranoid sample 
Based on the findings by Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) and the assumption that paranoia 
exists on a continuum (Chapman & Chapman, 1980; Claridge, 1997; van Os et al., 2009), the 
current study hypothesised that a hypersensitivity to the highly contingent avatar would be 
observed in the self-report measures of trust in the clinical sample but not in distance kept 
from the avatar. Exploratory data analysis gave no evidence that the contingency 
manipulation influenced subjective or trust behaviour.  
4.1.2.1 Safety behaviours and interpersonal distance 
People with persecutory delusions keep a “safe” distance from the avatar regardless of 
avatar responsiveness level i.e. they maintain a distance from the avatar that minimises 
feelings of discomfort or prevents the activation of a threat response. Interestingly, this is 
in line with Fornells-Ambrojo et al (2016) non-clinical study but also with data from 
naturalistic settings, such as an experience sampling study in which paranoid thinking was 
found to be immune to social context (familiarity) in people with high paranoia (Collip et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, a recent study found that state paranoid experiences in people 
with schizophrenia predicted greater interpersonal distance in a stop-distance paradigm 
compared to individuals with schizophrenia and low paranoia and non-clinical controls 
(Schoretsanitis, Kutynia, Stegmayer, Strik & Walther, 2016). 
The minimum distance kept from the avatar was significantly associated with 
severity of delusion and post-VR negative affect, indicative of the employment of greater 
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interpersonal safety behaviours in individuals with more severe persecutory delusions and 
those experiencing greater emotional discomfort. Safety behaviours, such as interpersonal 
distance kept during a verbal exchange, are performed with the aim of protecting against a 
feared threat, and not only prevent disconfirmation of paranoid beliefs (Freeman et al., 
2007), but also are likely to elicit confirmatory evidence, for example by giving the 
interlocutor the impression that one is less trusting or interested in them as signalled by 
keeping farther away during the communicative exchange. Further research could 
investigate the role of contingency in more ambiguous or threatening environments given 
that Veling et al (2016) reported increased paranoia in virtual reality scenarios showing 
higher levels of hostility, population and ethnic density in comparison to less socially 
stressful scenes. However, it is also possible that more subtle environmental cues, such as 
interpersonal responsiveness, do not influence trusting behaviour. 
4.1.2.2 Subjective trust  
 No hypersensitivity was found towards the highly contingent avatar based on self-report 
trust towards the virtual flatmate in a clinical sample with persecutory delusions. A number 
of possible explanations are now considered. 
 It is possible that a type II error has occurred in the current study due to lack of 
power and a true hypersensitivity to contingency has not been detected. However, it is also 
plausible that the previous findings by Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) are not true for a 
clinical population with paranoia. It is important to consider that not all processes relevant 
to paranoid ideation may exist on the entire paranoia spectrum and factors specific to 
clinical populations may further influence the formation of persecutory delusions. For 
example, attribution biases and ToM deficits are predominantly reported in populations 
with acute paranoid delusions compared to remitted, other clinical and non-clinical 
populations; and there is mixed evidence for their presence along the paranoia continuum 
(e.g. Kettle, O’Brien-Simpson & Allen, 2008; Mehl et al., 2010; McKay, Langdon & Coltheart, 
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2005; Diez-Alegría et al., 2006; Lincoln et al., 2010). This is perhaps why correlations were 
observed between severity of persecutory delusions (PSYRATS-D) and outcome measures 
of objective trust and other-focused attention, but not between the amount of paranoid 
delusions reported (GPTS). The PSYRATS-D measures the severity of delusions across a 
number of dimensions, including distress and disruption to daily living, whereas the GPTS 
measures frequency and endorsement of paranoia beliefs. It is plausible that the PSYRATS-
D is more sensitive to the presence of mechanisms relevant to persecutory delusions in 
comparison to the GPTS. Principally, the PSYRATS-D may be more sensitive to the presence 
of safety behaviours associated with interpersonal distance kept from the avatar, and 
hypervigilance to external threat, an associated phenomenon in persecutory delusions 
(Freeman, Garety & Phillips, 2000; Freeman et al., 2002), which may explain the observed 
association with other-focused attention.  
 Blakemore et al. (2003) proposed that clinical individuals with paranoia over-
attribute contingent behaviour. It is possible that a misperception of contingent behaviour 
in the low contingency condition therefore levelled the perceptions of subjective trust 
across the two conditions. The non-significant difference in participants’ detection of 
contingency in the high and low contingency groups potentially supports this theory, but 
the sample size is too small to clearly establish if a misperception of contingency existed in 
the clinical sample.  
 Another explanation is that reasoning biases present in a clinical population were 
influencing subjective appraisals of trust towards the avatar, irrespective of the avatar’s 
behavioural contingency. A reasoning bias identified as a contributory factor in the 
occurrence of paranoid delusions is jumping to conclusions (JTC) (Bentall et al., 2009; 
Garety & Freeman, 1999; Garety et al., 2013). Associated with working memory (Freeman 
et al., 2014; Garety et al., 2013; Lunt et al., 2012), JTC is the process of limited information 
gathering before reaching a conclusion. The positive relationship found between subjective 
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trust and positive emotions experienced in the virtual reality environment may be 
indicative of participants basing their perceptions of trust on their affective state during the 
virtual interaction, without using further interpersonal information (i.e. contingency) to 
reach their conclusion. This is further supported by the literature that suggests that 
attribution biases are present in individuals with persecutory delusions during both positive 
and negative events (Lincoln, Mehl, Exner, Lindenmeyer & Rief, 2010).   
4.1.3. Social anxiety and self-focussed attention in people with paranoia: a complex story 
The clinical literature suggests that a subset of individuals with persecutory delusions have 
significant levels of social anxiety and that this may contribute to the occurrence of 
paranoid ideation (Lysaker et al., 2010). As self-focused attention has been implicated as a 
key process in social anxiety and, to a lesser extent, psychosis, it was hypothesised that 
higher self-focus attention would be associated with higher social anxiety in the current 
sample. Despite half of the current sample self-reporting clinical levels of social anxiety, 
only a minority of individuals reported high levels of self-focused attention during the 
virtual reality scenario and the relationship between social anxiety and self-focused 
attention was non-significant. Consideration of the pleasant nature and low level of 
subjective distress observed during the virtual reality environment provides some 
explanation for this finding. Glick et al. (2011) found that the relationship between social 
anxiety and state self-focused attention was partially mediated by experiential distress in a 
non-clinical population high in social anxiety. Furthermore, Clark & Wells (1995) propose 
that the relevant processes of self-focused attention are activated when an individual 
enters a “feared social situation”. It is therefore plausible that the current sample, 
particularly those scoring high in social anxiety, were not experiencing levels of distress 
intense enough to trigger heightened levels of self-focused attention during the virtual 
reality scenario, hence no association was found. The findings that the virtual reality 
scenario was a mostly positive experience with minimal levels of negative affect reported, 
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and the significant reduction in negative affect by the end of the scenario, supports this 
hypothesis. In addition, participants were instructed to ‘speak’ with the avatar (using the 
question prompts). This forced contact may have prevented participants fully engaging in 
attention directed towards the self. 
Based on Clark & Wells’ (1995) model of social anxiety that proposed that self-
focused attention limits the processing of external socially relevant information and 
supportive empirical evidence, it was hypothesised that self-focused attention would be 
negatively associated with other-focused attention. However, the data contradicted this 
prediction, showing instead the participants who paid greater attention to themselves also 
reported paying greater attention to their external environment, including the avatar. 
Further inspection of the literature on self-focused attention reveals inconsistencies 
between whether self-focused attention does, in fact, limited other-focused attention. For 
example, Panayiotou & Vrana (1998) found that self-focused manipulation in a socially 
anxious group did not decrease attention to the environment but may have enhanced it. 
Holzman & Valentiner (2016) found that high socially anxious individuals demonstrated 
higher levels of both self- and other-focused attention compared to those low in social 
anxiety. Both studies contradict the assertion that focus of attention is one-directional.  
Spurr & Stopa (2002) highlight the complexity of self-focused attention in their 
review of the literature. The authors emphasised that the mechanistic function of self-
focused attention in social anxiety cannot be explained simply by the presence of attention 
to the self. The content of self-focused attention is highlighted to play a crucial role in 
influencing appraisals of social situations. In Carver & Scheier’s (1982; 2012) cybernetic 
theory of self-regulation, a distinction is made between two types of self-focused attention 
based on content: private self-consciousness (i.e. focus on psychological aspects of 
themselves, such as thoughts, feelings and attitudes) and public self-consciousness (i.e. 
awareness of themselves being processed as social objects, such as the impression they are 
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making on another). Public self-consciousness has been shown to be a strong predictor of 
social anxiety (Darvill, Johnson & Danko, 1992).  
As it would seem that the mechanism by which self-focused attention impacts 
upon social anxiety is complex, it is fair to assume that a similar complexity exists in its role 
in clinical paranoia. Rietdijk et al. (2009) reflect on the complexities of the relationship 
between social phobia and paranoid ideation in the general population. They propose the 
two phenomena may share psychological mechanisms i.e. subject of attention, heightened 
self-consciousness, scanning the environment, overestimating the impact of behaviour and 
self-reference and confirmation biases. However, the shared mechanisms are driven by 
different motives: fear of rejection versus fear of persecution, which lead to different 
psychological outcomes.   
Should a positive relationship between self- and other-focus of attention truly exist 
in clinically paranoid populations, this might suggest a more general state of higher 
awareness (both to self and others) experienced by some in social interactions, influenced 
by factors specific to processes of paranoid ideation e.g. hypervigilance to threat.  The 
significant positive correlation found between other-focused attention and severity of 
delusion may suggest that other-focus of attention is driven by factors more relevant to 
delusional processes than those of social anxiety. Furthermore, the literature on self-
focused attention places great emphasis on its influence on self-perception, rather than 
perceptions of another. It is important for future research to further investigate the 
relationship between self- and other-focus of attention in social interactions in individuals 
with clinical paranoia and how this might impact on their interpersonal experiences.  
4.1.4. Lack of influence of self-focused attention in trust perception 
Against hypotheses, no influence of self-focused attention in trust perception was found. 
Again, this finding is possibly due to lack of power. However, possible explanations could be 
drawn from considering the content of self- and other-focused attention. 
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Carver & Scheier’s (1982; 2012) cybernetic theory of self-regulation proposes that 
self-focus attention may provide a feedback cycle which allows a person to become aware 
of processes towards a goal and take appropriate action, effecting changes if there is a 
discrepancy between the perceived standard of behaviour and actual behaviour.  The 
greater the discrepancy, the greater the distress experienced in a social interaction. 
Furthermore, the extent to which self-focused attention negatively impacts on perceptions 
of a social interaction is dependent on whether the content of self-consciousness is positive 
or negative. It is plausible that the pleasantness of the interaction with the avatar, and the 
fact that the avatar would not respond to any nervousness in the participants, was 
incorporated into a feedback loop of social performance that minimised negative self-
focused attention assessed in the FAQ e.g. anxiety, memories of past social failures. Further 
investigation into the content of participants’ focus of attention (e.g. positive or negative, 
public or private self-consciousness) might give further insight into the role of self- and 
other-focused attention in interpersonal experiences in paranoia.  
Graphical exploratory data analysis (EDA) of focus of attention and subjective trust 
suggested that there is potentially a link between focus of attention and trust in the low 
contingency condition. Conclusions drawn from this must be very tentative due to the small 
sample. However, Fornells-Ambrojo et al. (2016) found that dismissive attachment 
predicted greater subjective trust in the non-clinical sample. Potentially, the low 
contingency condition was more likely to elicit an insecure attachment response to the 
avatar, hence the greater attention paid to the self (private self-consciousness) and the 
other, the greater the subjective trust rating.  
4.2. Limitations 
The current findings must be interpreted in the context of a number of limitations. Whilst 
the sample size allowed for adequate exploration of the feasibility of the interactive virtual 
reality environment in a clinical population with paranoia and overall associations with 
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paranoia, a clear limitation of the study is a sample size without enough statistical power to 
detect effects of contingency manipulation or self-focused attention. Therefore any 
conclusions drawn about contingency and focus of attention in clinical paranoia can only be 
very tentative. Exploratory data analysis (EDA) was employed to allow a more exploratory 
approach to potential trends emerging from the data. However, small-n EDA remains 
susceptible to biases in the data from outliers.  
The current study also used multiple statistical tests to explore correlations 
between outcome measures. This will have increased the likelihood that a type I error may 
have occurred in the analysis i.e. rejecting a null hypothesis (H0) when it is true. Applying 
Bonferroni corrections (Cabin & Mitchell, 2000) would have minimised the chance of type I 
errors occurring, yet applying these corrections would have rendered most of the 
significant tests non-significant. There is no formal consensus for when Bonferroni 
corrections should be used (Perneger, 1998) and it is noted that applying Bonferonni 
corrections increases the likelihood of type II errors (i.e. accepting H0 when it is false), thus 
reducing the power of a study (Nakagawa, 2004). Hence, the decision was made not to use 
these corrections in the current study.  
 The qualitative feedback from participants helped enrich findings from this study, 
particularly enabling firmer conclusions to be drawn about the feasibility of interactive 
virtual reality. However, a comment must be made about the potential for response bias. 
The interview was conducted by the researchers with whom participants had conducted all 
other research tasks. This may have influenced greater positive feedback about their 
experience or a with-holding of negative feedback about their experience.  
The pleasant nature of the scenario, reflected by the PANAS and participant 
feedback, could be considered to limit the generalisability of findings. It is proposed that 
social cognitive biases are greatly exacerbated in clinical individuals with paranoia when 
there is a perceived threat to self or under conditions of stress (Bentall et al., 2001; Lincoln, 
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Lange, Burau, Exner & Moritz, 2010; Lincoln, Peter, Schäfer & Moritz, 2009). Similarly, 
research has found that the impact of self-focused attention on social appraisals is 
mediated by experiential distress (Glick et al. 2011). It is difficult to determine the impact of 
interpersonal contingency or self-focused attention on trust if the virtual reality scenario 
was more ambiguous or anxiety provoking. Virtual reality experiments that have used more 
ambiguous paradigms have found clinical participants with paranoia experience paranoid 
ideation towards avatars (Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2008). It may be that if a threshold of 
experiential discomfort is reached, cognitive factors relevant to clinical paranoia become 
more influential on subjective interpersonal experiences, such as trust.  
Clearly, the study’s all-male sample contributes to limitations in the studies 
generalizability. Significant gender differences have been found in sense of presence 
experienced in virtual reality, with men experiencing a higher sense of spatial presence, 
perceived realism and sense of immersion in the environment (Felnhofer et al., 2012). This 
limits the assertion that interactive virtual reality is a feasible research methodology for 
both men and women with clinical paranoia, particularly with regards to a sense of 
presence in the environment and interaction. Furthermore, the salience of paranoid 
ideation may vary between clinical individuals with paranoia, both in the current sample 
and wider population, based on the dissonance between their idiosyncratic belief system 
and the presence of a Caucasian, male avatar.  
4.3. Future research and clinical implications 
In the current study, one participant was quoted saying “The technology is impressive, in 
two years tech will be able to be used for mental health to help people that can't get out of 
the house. They can use it to gradually get out, talk to people.  It could be used 
therapeutically, would be really helpful." Although this is perhaps a distant future 
implication for interactive virtual reality as a therapeutic tool in paranoia, it coincides with 
the emergence of exposure-based virtual reality being effectively used as a therapeutic tool 
122 
 
with individuals with persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2016) and other mental health 
conditions such as social phobia (Klinger et al., 2005). Interpersonally interactive virtual 
reality may prove to be a useful therapeutic tool in addition to exposure-based 
interventions for individuals with clinical paranoia, particularly those with very limited 
social contact. 
 However, future research needs to expand on the feasibility of interactive virtual 
reality in clinical populations with paranoia. Addressing possible gender differences in 
senses of presence needs to be explored with a mixed gender clinical sample. Furthermore, 
as attention to content was highlighted as a potential issue to the feasibility of the 
interaction, future research should aim to further investigate the impact of severity and 
chronicity of psychotic illness on engagement in the virtual reality interaction including 
psychosis populations other than that of just first-episode.  
The role of interpersonal contingency in perceptions of trust in paranoia remains 
unclear. To truly investigate whether hypersensitivity to interpersonal contingency does 
exist in clinical individuals with paranoia, the current study needs to be replicated with a 
sample size large enough to reach satisfactory power. Particular focus should be given to 
evidence that either supports paranoia processes on a continuum or suggests that there 
are features of paranoid delusions that are exclusive to clinical populations. Similarly, the 
role of interpersonal contingency and trust needs further exploration in a more ambiguous 
or anxiety-provoking social interaction. This would potentially allow for further conclusions 
to be drawn about the impact of affective state on cognitive processes related to paranoid 
such as self-focused attention and reasoning biases.  
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1. Introduction 
This critical appraisal will review observations made during the processes of this research, 
both in the empirical study and in conducting the systematic review. The appraisal will also 
incorporate personal reflections. Firstly, it will consider observations of potential biases 
that exist in clinical literature, particularly those relevant to the dissemination of clinical 
research. Secondly, the benefits and challenges of recruiting from clinical populations are 
explored. Reflections are made about the positive impact of involving service users in 
research. Further reflections explore the impact recruitment challenges may have on 
encouraging research with clinical populations and thus the development of clinical 
knowledge. Finally, the concept of statistical power is considered. The possible restrictions 
that more orthodox methods of statistics may have on developing our knowledge of 
‘harder to reach’ populations are explored.  
2. A reflection on biases in clinical research  
My pre-training research experience had been in contributing to the cognitive model of 
persecutory delusions (Freeman et al., 2002). As a result, I was dedicated to pursuing a 
doctoral thesis project that investigated mechanisms of paranoia and involved researching 
a clinical population. Having been given the opportunity to do this, I noticed from early on 
in the research process that my personal experience had created a bias in my wish to 
investigate paranoia within the context of the aforementioned cognitive model. Despite a 
more open-minded approach to my clinical practice, I became aware that in research I was 
perhaps more wedded to a particular model than I should be. I observed that even with the 
insight of having this potential bias, it was at times difficult to remove myself from the wish 
to provide evidence for a model I had previously been invested in. This led to an overall 
reflection about the biases that can arise in clinical psychology, even with the best 
intentions to remain neutral. 
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The process of conducting a systematic literature review evoked particular 
reflections on publication bias. Publication bias is originally defined as the selective 
publishing of studies with a particularly outcome, usually favouring significant results over 
those accepting a null hypothesis. In mental health research, particular focus has been 
given to selective publication of positive outcomes in clinical trials investigating the efficacy 
of anti-depressants (Robinson, 2008; Turner, Matthews, Linardatos, Tell & Rosenthal, 
2008). Whilst this research highlighted the potential for corruption of research due to the 
economic incentives of pharmaceutical companies, it also indicated that publication biases 
throughout mental health research may be distorting scientific and public knowledge about 
the mechanisms and treatment of clinical conditions (Rothstein, Sutton & Borenstein, 
2005).  
Further conceptualisation of publication biases highlights numerous potential 
mechanisms of information suppression beyond the original definition. These include 
language bias (selective inclusion of studies published in English); familiarity bias (selective 
inclusion of studies from one’s own discipline) and outcome bias (selective reporting of 
some outcomes but not others in clinical studies) (Rothstein, Sutton & Borenstein, 2005). 
The broader term of ‘dissemination bias’ has been suggested to encapsulate all of these 
potential biases (Song et al., 2010). Holding these biases in mind, as well as potential 
personal biases, proved useful when conducting the systematic literature review.  
A clear observation from the literature review was the dominance of a particular 
research group in clinical trials of psychological treatments impacting on paranoia. The 
original intent of the literature review was to only be a meta-analysis. However, it was clear 
from conducting preliminary literature searches to form the research question that a meta-
analysis in isolation would limit the broader picture of treatments for paranoia. Yet, even 
with a wider synthesis, a dissemination bias towards this research group continued to exist. 
This promoted a reflection on the impact of research resources and the narrative in clinical 
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research that the gold standard of randomised controlled trails (RCTs) overshadows 
smaller-scale research in the same field. It would seem that larger research groups have the 
resources to conduct larger scale research with methodology (e.g. multi-site RCTs) that is 
viewed as superior to other studies (e.g. pilots and case-studies) by authors who do not 
have access to the same resources, particularly financial. Whilst RCTs included in the 
literature review predominantly used unbiased methodology e.g. blinding, preplanned 
analysis etc., there remains a clear potential for the suppression of research of other 
therapeutic interventions for paranoia. 
This observation drew a number of parallels with the experience of recruiting a 
clinical sample for the current empirical study. Whilst the importance of conducting 
research on clinical populations, particularly those considered ‘hard to reach’, is clear, 
there were many challenges involved in recruiting from a population of individuals with 
psychosis and paranoia within a NHS setting.  
3. The highs and lows of conducting research with clinical populations 
3.1. The need to engage clinical populations in experimental research 
The benefits of conducting research in clinical populations are clear. As was reflected in 
parts of the empirical study and literature review, there are only so many conclusions that 
can be drawn from investigating non-clinical samples with sub-clinical threshold symptoms. 
There are many factors both within and beyond mental health diagnoses that can be 
specific to individuals from a clinical population, such as cognitive deficits associated with 
schizophrenia (Heinrichs, Walter, Zakzanis & Konstantine, 1998), the experience and impact 
of societal stigma (Corrigan, Druss & Perlick, 2014) and an increased likelihood of having 
experience childhood adversity or trauma (e.g. Edwards, Holden, Felitti & Anda, 2003). The 
conclusions drawn in both the systematic review and empirical study of this thesis suggest 
that there are psychological factors which are exclusive to persecutory delusions. Whilst 
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such conclusions in no way disregard the hypothesis of a continuum of paranoia (e.g. 
Chapman & Chapman, 1980; Claridge, 1997; van Os et al., 2009), they call for greater 
empirical research on the understanding of the similarities and differences between sub-
clinical and clinical paranoia. This, of course, requires recruiting from a clinical population.  
3.2. The barriers to recruiting clinical participants 
Problems with recruitment in psychiatric populations are well documented, both 
anecdotally and in the literature (Patel, Doku & Tennakoon, 2003). They have been shown 
to disrupt schedules for research projects, preoccupy staff, reduce the ability to detect 
therapeutic differences and can result in a trial being abandoned (Ashery & McAuliffe, 
1992). Furthermore, factors such as non-response and selection biases can mean that 
eligible participants entering studies influence the validity of the representativeness of the 
clinical population being studied (Woods, Ziedonis, Sernyak, Diaz & Rosenheck, 2000; 
Hulley, Cummings, Browner, Grady & Newman, 2001). This is principally based on the 
concept that those who do not respond after being contacted are different from people 
who do participate. Armstrong et al. (1992) explored characteristics associated with poor 
response rate in clinical populations and found that some main factors adversely affecting 
response rates were: older age, male gender, non-Caucasian ethnicity, urban residence, 
unemployment or low education/occupation status, low family income, smoker and high 
use of medical care. Perhaps with some exceptions, these characteristics capture a 
significant proportion of individuals with psychosis (Castle & Murray, 1991; Marwaha & 
Johnson, 2004; Ruhrmann et al., 2010; Sundquist, Frank & Sundquist, 2004). 
However, from the experience of conducting the current research, there were a 
number of challenges and barriers to recruitment that were not directly related to the 
service users themselves. In the early stages of the study, ethical and NHS Research and 
Development (R&D) approval, for obvious and appropriate reasons, was a lengthy 
procedure that required specific restrictions on recruitment strategies. Participants could 
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only be recruited from Early Intervention in Psychosis services (EIS) pre-named in the 
ethical application. Experience from a previous role as a research assistant had highlighted 
the critical importance of engaging service team members. It was similarly apparent for the 
current project that recruitment hinged on the engagement of service team members in 
approaching their service users to suggest the research to them. Furthermore, it became 
clear that the presence of the researchers in the clinical teams was an important factor in 
the number of referrals received. This highlighted a critical learning point in conducting 
research: efforts to engage health care professions in clinical research are as important as 
engaging the service users. Furthermore, engagement of either takes time - time that is not 
always available to health care professionals attempting to conduct research whilst also 
balancing clinical caseloads.  
Two distinct barriers in engaging health care professionals became apparent. 
Recent re-structuring of many EIS teams has seen dramatic increases in the caseloads, and 
therefore workloads, of care coordinators (Belling et al., 2011). Although efforts were made 
on the researchers’ behalf to minimise any work required of care coordinators to aid 
recruitment, it was clear that holding our research in mind and approaching service users 
was burdensome for many health care professionals. In addition, differences were 
experienced in care coordinators perceptions of the usefulness of research. 
Understandably, those who viewed research as less integral to clinical care were less 
inclined to refer service uses or encourage their clients to engage in the research. A greater 
presence of the researchers in the teams enabled a greater alliance to be formed with 
team members. This alliance became helpful in combatting negative views about research 
in certain team members and thus improved recruitment. However, time constraints for 
the project and the researchers meant resources to fully engage many of the EIS teams 
were not possible, highlighting the time resources necessary to reach recruitment targets 
in quantitative research in clinical populations.  
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Many clinical research trials employ junior researchers to undertake recruitment in 
order to meet necessary targets for statistical power (Dowling & Weiner, 1997). However, 
this is not a widely available option for many clinical psychologists wishing to conduct 
research in clinical populations. Without these resources, researchers can run the risk of 
under-recruitment and therefore under-powered findings. This then impacts upon the 
acceptability and generalisability of conclusions and the wider dissemination of knowledge 
within clinical psychology (e.g. publications). It is barriers such as these that stand to 
potentially discourage researchers from attempting to conduct research in clinical 
populations unless they have the resources more commonly seen in larger, well-establish 
research groups.  This arguably contributes to dissemination biases and impoverished 
knowledge, particularly in populations considered “hard-to-reach”. 
3.3. The benefits of recruiting clinical populations 
As previously discussed, it is important to investigate the continuum of psychological 
phenomena and whether there are distinct features of clinical conditions that set 
individuals who suffer from these conditions apart from non-clinical populations. However, 
there are other benefits of recruiting from clinical populations that were experienced 
during this research that warrant specific reflections.  
As the researcher, I was overwhelmed by the enthusiasm and effort participants 
showed to take part in our research. Some travelled for over an hour and were quite 
insistent that they did not wish to be paid for participation; the opportunity to try virtual 
reality was incentive enough. Others informed us that they very rarely left the house or 
socialised with others, but were motivated to be involved in something that might not only 
help them  but would also help other people who use mental health services. Some also 
used the experiment as a space to talk about current serious difficulties that we were able 
to feed back to the care coordinators and promote more support for that individual during 
a time of need. Overall, my sense as a researcher during the experiments was that engaging 
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this clinical population was providing them with an opportunity to do something ‘out of the 
ordinary’ and altruistic – something that was clearly meaningful to them.  
There is some research that explores the importance of people with mental health 
difficulties having the opportunity to help others. The helper-therapy principle (Reissman, 
1965; 1990) proposes; assuming an individual has a worthwhile contribution to make, a 
greater sense of self-efficacy and capability can be promoted. Furthermore, the theory 
suggests that when individuals are put in an active role, rather than a passive recipient role 
they can: impact on wellbeing (Mead & Copeland, 2000), combat feelings of dependence, 
engender a sense of status in an individual, and encourage a greater sense of positive self-
identity (Reissman, 1990; Salzer & Shear, 2002; Skovholt, 1974). This feels particularly 
relevant in a group of individuals who can experience some of the more severe forms of 
stigma amongst mental health difficulties (Brohan, Elgie, Sartorius & Thornicroft, 2010). 
Engagement in activities of value in young people with psychosis has also been found to 
have a positive impact on their wellbeing (Lal et al., 2013). Qualitative analysis found the 
key factors which made activities meaningful were a sense of making a contribution, 
expressing thoughts and emotions and additionally, connecting and belonging.   
For numerous reasons, research might not be an enjoyable or meaningful activity 
for all individuals with psychosis or, indeed, other mental health conditions. However, my 
experience of conducting research with individuals that are perhaps more difficult to 
engage is that, selection biases aside, the majority of individuals from clinical populations 
who take part will enjoy the process. Furthermore, this did not feel like a narrative that was 
shared by the healthcare professionals. Many were reluctant to approach their clients to 
suggest the research, assuming it would be burdensome, distressing or disinteresting for 
the person. In order to amend the common consensus amongst researchers and clinicians 
that recruiting from clinical populations has many challenges; a step should be taken in 
clinical psychology to understand the dynamics of these difficulties from three key 
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perspectives: the participants, the referring clinicians and the researchers. It may well be 
that there are misunderstandings and miscommunications than can be reduced or avoided 
in the future. With hope, a greater understanding of the benefits and barriers of engaging 
clinical populations in research will improve recruitment and therefore increase the 
likelihood and frequency of clinical research from many, independent researchers.   
4. The issue of power – Baseyian vs Orthodox statistics in ‘hard to reach’ 
populations 
Whether recruiting from a non-clinical or clinical population, the importance of achieving a 
sample size with enough power to reliably detect an effect becomes a prominent, if not 
overwhelming, concern in a researcher’s mind. The emphasis on achieving power in a 
sample is largely driven by the logic of orthodox statistics, as developed by Jerzy Neyman 
and Egon Pearson in the 1930s. Orthodox statistics primarily function from the assumption 
that probabilities are long-run relative frequencies (Dienes, 2008), which in turn require an 
indefinitely large series of events that constitutes as a ‘collective’ (von Mises, 1957). These 
collectives are often populations (e.g. gender, culture, specified clinical diagnosis) that can 
be used to predict the likelihood that an observed event (e.g. a study’s finding) would occur 
in that collective and in comparison to other collectives (e.g. a non-clinical population), 
thus allowing for the accepting or rejection of a null hypothesis. It is an incredibly useful 
mathematical and theoretical application that strengthens the certainty with which we can 
understand and treat psychological phenomena.   
In orthodox statistics, the concept of statistical power proposes that with prior 
knowledge of the effect size of an observable phenomenon and defined parameters to 
reduce type I and type II error (α and β), a researcher can determine the sample size 
needed to reliably reject the null hypothesis in the event of statistically significant results 
(Ellet, 2010). Reflections on this process during the empirical research began to pose 
questions about whether an emphasis on statistical power becomes overly restrictive when 
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researching ‘hard to reach’ populations or when exploring hypotheses with little prior 
research from which to estimate an effect size. Arguably, if one cannot know the a priori 
effect size or whether it exists in a relatively unknown ‘collective’, one cannot accurately 
assume the sample size calculation is correct. This then places an arbitrary restriction on 
the interpretation of findings. 
Bayesian statistics suggest a slightly different approach can be taken within 
quantitative research which minimizes the importance of power. Barker, Pistrang & Elliott 
(2016) remark than the there is some merit in the application of Bayesian thought in clinical 
psychology research as it proposes that any data is useful and that small-N studies should 
not be avoided. However, Bayesian theories also concede that the larger the sample size, 
the more the study will add to prior knowledge (Dienes, 2011; 2014; Edwards, Lilford, 
Braunholtz & Jackson, 1997). Whilst both Bayesian and Orthodox statistics have their 
merits and limitations, the latter is a far more widely accepted approach in clinical 
psychology. This poses the question of how much research defined as underpowered has 
either gone unpublished or received minimal attention in literature, despite it plausibly 
adding to valuable knowledge. Furthermore, a fixation on statistical power is arguably 
limiting our knowledge of ‘harder-to-reach’ clinical or societal populations. This could be 
compounding the difficulties and discouragements faced by researchers attempting to 
recruit from these populations, contributing to a wider dissemination bias in clinical 
psychology.  
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Appendix 1: Quality Rating Scale (Yates et al., 2005) 
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Appendix 2: Table of individual item quality rating scores for included 
studies 
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Appendix 3: Summary of Joint Project and Each Researcher’s Contribution 
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The virtual reality paradigm was developed and used in a previous doctoral thesis 
project by Dr Maikke Elenbaas, submitted in 2013. The two researchers on this joint 
thesis project were Gail Wingham (author) and Hannah Reidy, both supervised by Dr 
Miriam Fornells-Ambrojo and Professor Chris Barker. The current author’s project 
focused on virtual reality feasibility and contingency manipulation (two conditions: 
high vs low contingency) and self-focused attention in the development of trust in 
paranoia. The joint researcher (HR) focused on the impact of social capital and social 
connectedness in the development of trust in paranoia, treating the high and low 
contingency conditions as one condition.  
 
In designing the experiment, researchers independently selected measures that 
were related to their separate experimental hypotheses. The only measures shared 
by the researchers in their independent projects were the objective measure of trust 
(distance kept from avatar), Sense of Presence questionnaire (Slater et al., 1998) and 
attention checks (Elenbass, 2014; Fornells-Ambrojo et al., 2016). The semi-structure 
interview and debrief was designed by both researchers but there was no overlap of 
the data used from this measure in the separate empirical papers. The order of the 
experiment measures and procedures was collaborative decided upon by both 
researchers.    
 
Both researchers collective designed all project documents, including information 
sheets, consent forms and posters. Ethical and R&D approval was also a joint effort 
between the researchers.  
 
For recruitment, researchers each targeted two Early Intervention in Psychosis (EIS) 
teams in order to promote the research study and gain referrals from as wider scope 
as possible. Screening of referrals was largely shared between researchers, or 
dictated by prior engagement with a care coordinator or service-user. Researchers 
shared the responsibility of escorting participants to and from the testing location 
when needed and jointly conducted each experiment.  
 
Each empirical paper was written independent by the respective authors.  
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Appendix 4: Ethical Approval 
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Appendix 5: Participant Information Sheet 
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Appendix 6: Participant Consent Form 
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Appendix 7: Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale  
(Green et al., 2008) 
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Version 2 01.07.15 
GPTS 
Participant no: 
Instructions: Please read each of the statements carefully. 
They refer to thoughts and feelings you may have had about others over the last month. 
Think about the last month and indicate the extent of these feelings from 1 (Not at all) to 5 
(Totally). 
Please complete both Part A and Part B. 
(N.B. Please do not rate items according to any experiences you may have had under the 
influence of drugs.) 
 
Part A 
Statement Not at 
all  
 Somewhat 
 
 Extremely  
1. I spent time thinking about friends 
gossiping about me  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I often heard people referring to me  1 2 3 4 5 
3. I have been upset by friends and 
colleagues judging me critically  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. People definitely laughed at me behind 
my back  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I have been thinking a lot about people 
avoiding me  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. People have been dropping hints for me  1 2 3 4 5 
7. I believed that certain people were not 
what they seemed  
1 2 3 4 5 
8. People talking about me behind my back 
upset me  
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I was convinced that people were singling 
me out  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I was certain that people have followed 
me  
1 2 3 4 5 
11. Certain people were hostile towards me 
personally  
1 2 3 4 5 
12. People have been checking up on me  1 2 3 4 5 
13. I was stressed out by people watching 
me  
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I was frustrated by people laughing at 
me  
1 2 3 4 5 
15. I was worried by people’s undue interest 
in me  
1 2 3 4 5 
16. It was hard to stop thinking about people 
talking about me behind my back  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Part B 
Statement Not at 
all  
 Somewhat 
 
 Extremely  
1. Certain individuals have had it in for me  1 2 3 4 5 
2. I have definitely been persecuted  1 2 3 4 5 
3. People have intended me harm  1 2 3 4 5 
4. People wanted me to feel threatened, so 
they stared at me  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I was sure certain people did things in 
order to annoy me  
1 2 3 4 5 
6. I was convinced there was a conspiracy 
against me  
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I was sure someone wanted to hurt me  1 2 3 4 5 
8. I was distressed by people wanting to 
harm me in some way  
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I was preoccupied with thoughts of 
people trying to upset me deliberately  
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I couldn’t stop thinking about people 
wanting to confuse me  
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I was distressed by being persecuted  1 2 3 4 5 
12. I was annoyed because others wanted to 
deliberately upset me  
1 2 3 4 5 
13. The thought that people were 
persecuting me played on my mind  
1 2 3 4 5 
14. It was difficult to stop thinking about 
people wanting to make me feel bad  
1 2 3 4 5 
15. People have been hostile towards me on 
purpose  
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I was angry that someone wanted to 
hurt me  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 8: Prompt sheet for virtual reality scenario 
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1. What do you like about flat 
sharing? 
 
2. How do you choose flatmates? 
 
3. What makes  a good flatmate? 
 
4. What’s the best thing about this 
flat?
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Appendix 9: Full script of conversation with avatar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
A=Avatar 
P=Participant 
A: Hi my name is Mark thanks for coming. What’s your name?” 
P: (Tells avatar their name) 
A: Thanks, OK I’m ready! 
P: What do you like about flat sharing? 
A: I enjoy meeting new people... I have made new friends this way...its great getting 
to know them, have a laugh... mhm... and it helps to keep the cost of living low so 
you can live in a better area! 
P: What do you ask potential flatmates before going ahead? 
A: Well, I always meet them in person and get a sense of what they are like... I ask 
them what they are looking for in a shared flat, what is a typical day like for them, 
what music they like, if they smoke, if they are lazy about house chores... mhm.. If 
they like having friends around ... Oh, yeah it is also good to ask them what has 
been their best and worse experience of flat sharing! 
P: In your experience... who makes a great flatmate? 
A: Mhm... good question... don’t know... I’m trying to think ....someone how is 
easygoing, friendly and fun but who also can give you space... It is also good to 
have something in common with them, like love for sport, or music...It’s hard to 
answer because I think it really depends on the person... I’ve got on with people 
who were completely different from me, sometimes it just works. 
P: What is the best thing about your flat? 
A: The terrace and the view! Come and have a look! (moves to the window) 
A: It’s amazing to have all this outside space, in the summer we practically live 
outside! We have great BBQs.... 
(Phone rings – avatar answers and speaks discreetly on the phone) 
A: Hello? Okay..yeah I can be there!okay bye. 
A: Oh, sorry but I need to go now... anyway thank you for coming and maybe we 
can continue the interview some other time? 
P: (Answers) 
SCENARIO ENDS 
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Appendix 10: The Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scale – Delusions  
(PSYRATS-D; Haddock et al., 1999) 
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1 Amount of preoccupation with delusions 
0 No delusions, or delusions which the subject thinks about less than once a week 
1 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once a week  
2 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once a day  
3 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once an hour  
4 Subject thinks about delusions continuously or almost continuously 
 
2 Duration of preoccupation with delusions 
0 No delusions 
1 Thoughts about beliefs last for a few seconds, fleeting thoughts 
2 Thoughts about delusions last for several minutes  
3 Thoughts about delusions last for at least 1 hour  
4 Thoughts about delusions usually last for hours at a time 
 
3  Conviction 
0 No conviction at all 
1 Very little conviction in reality of beliefs, < 10%  
2 Some doubts relating to conviction in beliefs, between 10-49% 
3 Conviction in belief is very strong, between 50-99 % 
4 Conviction is 100 % 
 
4  Amount of distress 
0 Beliefs never cause distress 
1 Beliefs cause distress on the minority of occasions  
2 Beliefs cause distress on < 50% of occasions 
3 Beliefs cause distress on the majority of occasions when they occur between 50-99% of time 
4 Beliefs always cause distress when they occur 
 
5  Intensity of distress 
0 No distress 
1 Beliefs cause slight distress 
2 Beliefs cause moderate distress 
3 Beliefs cause marked distress 
4 Beliefs cause extreme distress, could not be worse 
 
6 Disruption to life caused by beliefs 
0 No disruption to life, able to maintain independent living with no problems in daily living skills. Able 
to maintain social and family relationships (if present) 
1 Beliefs cause minimal amount of disruption to life, e.g. interferes with concentration although able to 
maintain daytime activity and social and family relationships and be able to maintain independent living 
without support 
2 Beliefs cause moderate amount of disruption to life causing some disturbance to daytime activity 
and/or family or social activities. The patient is not in hospital although may live in supported 
accommodation or receive additional help with daily living skills 
3 Beliefs cause severe disruption to life so that hospitalisation is usually necessary. The patient is able 
to maintain some daily activities, self-care and relationships while in hospital. The patient may be also be 
in supported accommodation but experiencing severe disruption of life in terms of activities, daily living 
skills and/or relationships  
4 Beliefs cause complete disruption of daily life requiring hospitalization. The patient is unable to 
maintain any daily activities and social relationships. Self-care is also severely disrupted 
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Appendix 11: Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 
 (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998) 
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Instructions: For each item, please circle the number to indicate the degree to 
which you feel the statement is characteristic or true for you. The rating scale is as 
follows: 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me 
3 = Very characteristic or true of me 
4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me 
Characteristic Not at 
all 
Slightly Moderate
ly 
Very Extremel
y 
1. I get nervous if I have to speak with 
someone in authority (teacher, boss, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 4 
2. I have difﬁculty making eye contact with 
others 
0 1 2 3 4 
3. I become tense if I have to talk about 
myself or my feelings 
0 1 2 3 4 
4. I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to mix comfortably with 
the people I work with 
0 1 2 3 4 
5. I ﬁnd it easy to make friends my own 
age 
0 1 2 3 4 
6. I tense up if I meet an acquaintance in 
the street 
0 1 2 3 4 
7. When mixing socially, I am 
uncomfortable 
0 1 2 3 4 
8. I feel tense if I am alone with just one 
other person 
0 1 2 3 4 
9. I am at ease meeting people at parties, 
etc 
0 1 2 3 4 
10. I have difﬁculty talking with other 
people 
0 1 2 3 4 
11. I ﬁnd it easy to think of things to talk 
about 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I worry about expressing myself in 
case I appear awkward 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to disagree with 
another’s point of view 
0 1 2 3 4 
14. I have difﬁculty talking to attractive 
persons of the opposite sex 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. I ﬁnd myself worrying that I won’t 
know what to say in social situations 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. I am nervous mixing with people I 
don’t know well 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I feel I’ll say something embarrassing 
when talking 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. When mixing in a group, I ﬁnd myself 
worrying I will be ignored 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
20. I am unsure whether to greet 
someone I know only slightly 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix 12: Subjective Measure of Trust 
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How TRUSTWORTHY did Mark come across? 
Not at 
all 
 
     Very 
much 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix 13: Focus of Attention Questionnaire  
(FAQ; Woody, 1996) 
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Rate each answer between 1 and 5.  
1 = not at all, 5 = very much 
Self-focus Not 
at all 
 Somewhat  Very 
much 
1. I was focusing on what I would say 
or do next  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I was focusing on the impression I 
was making on the other person  
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I was focusing on my level of 
anxiety  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I was focusing on my internal bodily 
reactions (for example, heart rate)  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I was focusing on past social failures  1 2 3 4 5 
Other-focus Not 
at all 
 Somewhat  Very 
much 
1. I was focusing on the other person’s 
appearance or dress  
1 2 3 4 5 
2. I was focusing on the features of 
conditions of the physical 
surroundings (e.g. appearance, 
temperature)  
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I was focusing on how the other 
person might be feeling about 
himself/herself  
1 2 3 4 5 
4. I was focusing on what I thought of 
the other person  
1 2 3 4 5 
5. I was focusing on what the other 
person was saying or doing.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 14: Detection of Contingency and Attention Checks 
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Scenario Feedback and Checks 
 
1. In your experience of your interaction with the virtual flatmate, was there 
any relationship between what you did and the virtual flatmate’s actions? 
Please Circle 
Yes   No 
2. If you experience any relationship between what you did and the virtual 
flatmates actions, what did you notice? Please write your comments in the 
space below. 
 
 
Please circle whether the following statements are true or false 
1. One reason that Mark the virtual flatmate gave for why he likes flat sharing 
is that he has made new friends 
 
True   False 
 
2. When asked who makes a good flatmate, Mark mentioned that the most 
important thing is that they are tidy. 
 
True   False 
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Appendix 15: Sense of Presence Questionnaire  
(Slater et al., 1998) 
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The following questions relate to your recent virtual reality experience. Please read each 
question and answer as you are instructed in each one. 
 
1. Please rate the sense of actually being in the flat 
Abnormal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Normal experience 
of being  
Experience                                                                                                              in a flat 
 
2. To what extent were there times during the experience when the virtual flat became 
“reality” for you, and you almost forgot about the “real world” of the laboratory in which 
the whole experience was actually taking place? 
At no time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Almost all the time 
 
3. When you think back about your experience, do you think of the virtual flat more as 
“images that you saw”, or more as “somewhere you visited”? 
Images that 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Somewhere that I 
visited 
I saw 
 
4. During the experience, which was strongest on the whole, your sense of being in the 
virtual flat, or being in the real world of the laboratory 
Laboratory 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Virtual flat 
 
5. Consider your memory of being in the flat. How similar is the memory of the virtual 
reality experience to other memories of “real places” in terms of: visual quality, size, colour 
and how realistic and vivid it seems in your imagination? 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very similar 
Similar 
 
6. During the experience, did you think to yourself that you were actually “just standing in a 
room wearing equipment” or did the virtual flat “overwhelm” you? The virtual flat 
overwhelmed me… 
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 All of the time 
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Appendix 16: Semi-Structured Qualitative Interview 
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Qualitative Interview 
Q1. What did you think of Mark? 
Q2. Based on you experience of talking to Mark, what kind of impression did you have of 
him? How did he make you feel? 
Q3. Did you feel (instinctively) you could trust him? What kind of things made you feel that 
you could or couldn’t trust him?  
Q4. How did you feel about Mark as your interaction went along? Did you feel that he was 
honest and trustworthy? Why/Why not?  
Q5. What impressions do you think Mark may have got of you? Why? 
Q8. What did you think of the VR environment?  Do you have any feedback on the VR 
experience?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
